Last year we reported (here) that Alberta’s Redwater Energy Corporation decision signaled good news for lenders and noteholders secured by Alberta O&G assets because the federal Canadian Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (“BIA”) prevailed over conflicting provisions in the provincial regulations promulgated by the Alberta Energy Regulator (“AER”).

Last year, we reported that Australia had proposed significant insolvency reforms that, in our view, are long overdue ("A Major Leap Forward for Australian Insolvency Laws").

When the real estate market and financial markets tumbled during 2007-2008, the fallout was felt by financial institutions from large multi-billion dollar banks to small Community Banks. As these banks struggled to stay alive, a trend emerged for bank holding companies to market and sell a distressed bank through Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code. This alternative was utilized in many instances as opposed to a traditional “reorganization plan” or takeover by the FDIC.

On March 22, 2017, the Supreme Court, in Czyzewski et al., v. Jevic Holding Corp., et al., confirmed that the Bankruptcy Code does not permit “priority skipping” in Chapter 11 structured dismissals. In doing so, the Court held that, although the Code does not explicitly provide what, if any, priority rules apply to the distribution of estate assets in a Chapter 11 structured dismissal, “[a] distribution scheme in connection with the dismissal of a Chapter 11 case cannot, without the consent of the affected parties, deviate from the basic priority rules that apply under the . . .

This second installment of our series, “The Life Settlement Industry – Bankruptcy Issues”, will address two related issues:

(1) What type of interest (if any) does an investor-creditor have in a “life settlement” (i.e., a life insurance policy sold by the original owner to a third party for a value in excess of the policy’s cash surrender value, but less than its death benefit), and (2) How is the interest of an investor-creditor in a life settlement generally determined in a bankruptcy case?

When businesses experience financial difficulties, it is very common for them to “rob Peter to pay Paul.” Occasionally, this takes the form of using taxes that have been withheld from employees’ paychecks to pay expenses instead of remitting those funds to the IRS. Of course, it is well known that even though such obligations are corporate, individuals within the corporation determined to be “responsible persons” will be personally liable for such taxes.

A “life settlement” is the sale of a life insurance policy to a third party for a value in excess of the policy’s cash surrender value, but less than its death benefit. The life settlement industry focuses on the purchase and sale of life settlements or fractional interests in life settlements to investors. These investors may be anyone from individuals to groups of investors, hedge funds or other institutional investors.

Ruden McClosky, P.A. (“Ruden”), a formerly large and prestigious law firm that was founded in 1959 and at its peak had more than 200 attorneys commenced a bankruptcy case by filing a petition for Chapter 11 relief (“Petition”) in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida on November 1, 2011. The firm was a victim of the changing economy and the Great Recession. Ruden’s practiced largely in areas serving financial institutions and real estate developers—areas particularly hard hit by the recession.

The United States Supreme Court will review a decision of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, Johnson v. Midland Funding, LLC, to resolve a dispute between the circuits regarding whether the Bankruptcy Code provides the exclusive mechanism to determine the validity of a Proof of Claim or whether the filing of a faulty Proof of Claim gives rise to a debtor’s right to sue under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (the “FDCPA”). The Bankruptcy Code permits a creditor to file a claim if, among other things, the creditor has a right to payment.

Reversing the lower courts, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has today held that, under New York law (which governs 95% of all indentures), the early repayment of indenture notes in Chapter 11 is an optional redemption requiring the payment of make-whole notwithstanding the automatic acceleration of the notes due to the Chapter 11 filing. Delaware Trust Co. v. Energy Future Intermediate Holding Company LLC (In re Energy Future Holdings Corp.), Case No. 16-1251 (5th Cir. Nov. 17, 2016).