Recent caselaw demonstrates that there is a current judicial disagreement over whether the Bankruptcy Code will permit a cramdown in a jointly-administered bankruptcy case when a consenting class exists for only one of the debtors. This implicates the important issue of de facto substantive consolidation and the potential risks it poses to unsecured creditors.
On March 5, 2018, the Supreme Court issued a unanimous decision in U.S. Bank National Ass’n ex rel. CWCapital Asset Management LLC v.
The Bankruptcy Code provides bankruptcy trustees, debtors, and creditor committees with “avoidance powers” that allow them to set aside and recover certain transfers that a debtor made before filing for bankruptcy.[1] These avoidance powers are, however, limited by a number of exceptions enumerated in the Bankruptcy Code, including the securities safe harbor at § 546(e). Section 546(e) protects from avoidance any transfer “made by or to (or for the benefit of) . . .
Under newly issued guidance, the IRS has made it easier for many tax-exempt organizations to restructure.
The IRS will now continue to recognize as exempt, those organizations that:
• change their structure from an unincorporated association to a corporation;
• reincorporate from one state to another;
The Circuit Courts of Appeal have split on whether a prepetition transfer made by a debtor is avoidable if the transfer was made through a financial intermediary that was a mere conduit. Today, the Supreme Court unanimously resolved the split by deciding that transfers through “mere conduits” are not protected. This is a major (and adverse) decision for lenders, bondholders and noteholders who receive payments through an intermediary such as a disbursing agent.
Introduction
On September 22, 2017, the First Circuit Court of Appeals held that § 1109(b) of the Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”) provides a creditors’ committee with an “unconditional right to intervene” in an adversary proceeding.[1] In reaching this conclusion, the court reversed the District Court for the District of Puerto Rico’s order denying an intervention motion and distinguished its own precedent, on which the District Court had relied. This decision further bolsters the right of creditors’ com
In a previous article, The Eagle and the Bear: Russian Proceedings Recognized Under Chapter 15, we discussed In re Poymanov, in which the Bankruptcy Court (SDNY) recognized a Russian foreign proceeding under chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code even though the debtor had only nominal assets in the United States (the “Recognition Order”). The Bankruptcy Court had declined to rule upon recognition whether the automatic stay under 11 U.S.C.