Au début de la pandémie, on craignait que le nombre de dossiers de faillite grimpe de 35 % en 2020 et en 2021. Or, bien que certains secteurs aient été durement touchés, cette crainte ne s’est jamais matérialisée au Canada et aux États-Unis – possiblement en raison des mesures de soutien considérables qui ont été mises en œuvre par les gouvernements. Or, l’avenir ne semble pas tracé pour autant, puisque selon les prévisions d’Allianz Research, les procédures de faillite augmenteront de 15 % en 2022, alors que la croissance économique mondiale affichera un recul d’entre 5,5 % et 6 %.
At the start of the pandemic, insolvency filings were expected to increase by 35% in 2020 and 2021. While some industries were hit hard, this prediction never materialized in Canada and the U.S., possibly because of significant financial government support. The future is less clear, with Allianz Research forecasting, for 2022, a 15% increase in insolvency filings and a 5.5–6% decrease in global economic growth.
Below are five key trends that may impact insolvencies this year, based on data published by the World Bank:
This week, the Ninth Circuit takes a close look at a sizable antitrust jury award, and explains what constitutes a tax “return” for purposes of bankruptcy law.
OPTRONIC TECHNOLOGIES, INC v. NINGBO SUNNY ELECTRONIC CO. LTD.
The Court held that sufficient evidence supported a jury verdict holding telescope manufacturers liable for antitrust violations.
This update summarises the latest jurisprudence on insolvent schemes of arrangement (schemes) and restructuring plans (RPs), and provides an overview of the key themes that are emerging in this area.
Key Concepts and Notes
This week, the Ninth Circuit explains the ins-and-outs of property abandonment under the Bankruptcy Code, and explores the government’s privilege to withhold the identity of informants in discovery.
A comparison of the key differences between Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code and the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act.
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Many investors, including PE firms, are waiting with bated breath to see how the UK economy, currently dependent on COVID-19-related government support, will respond once that stimulus is withdrawn. An increase in UK company insolvencies is expected, creating opportunities for savvy investors to acquire businesses at bargain prices, while at the same time appearing to be white knights swooping in to save a beloved high street brand or large regional employer.
On 8 July 2021, the Payment and Electronic Money Institution Insolvency Regulations 2021 (the Regulations) will come into force in the UK and introduce a new special administration regime for insolvent payment institutions (PIs) and electronic money institutions (EMIs). The key purposes of the Regulations are to ensure that, if a PI or EMI becomes insolvent (and/or it is fair or expedient to put the institution into special administration), funds are quickly returned to customers and any shortfalls in the amounts available are minimised.
In dismissing Darty Holdings SAS’ (“Darty”) appeal in a recent decision[1], Miles J. has confirmed that an English court will look at the actual relationship between the parties involved, rather than the wider context, when considering whether those parties are connected. This will be the case even where the wider context consists of a transaction that will, immediately following the relevant transaction, sever that relationship.
Although not a new concept, use of the reverse vesting order (RVO) structure to effect distressed M&A transactions in proceedings under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (Canada) (CCAA) has quickly gained popularity in Canada over the last year. At its core, an RVO transaction involves a transfer of unwanted assets and liabilities — the “bad assets” — out of a distressed company into a newly established non-operating subsidiary, leaving the distressed business entity with only the “good assets” left to be acquired.