The judgment in the case of Belmont Park Investments Pty Limited v BNY Corporate Trustee Services Limited and Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc (UKSC 2009/0222), which began to be heard by the UK Supreme Court on March 1, 2011,1 was handed down on July 27, 2011. The case concerns the enforceability of so-called “flip clauses,” which provide that payment obligations owed to different creditors, in this case the swap counterparty and the noteholders, “flip” in priority following a counterparty bankruptcy.

In a decision that is expected to have wide-ranging implications for secured lenders and reorganization plan sales nationwide, the Seventh Circuit’s June 28, 2011 opinion in In re River Road1 marks a jurisdictional split on the contours of credit bidding in bankruptcy. While this decision is squarely at odds with decisions of the Courts of Appeals for the Third and Fifth Circuits, its holding is in many respects a validation of Judge Ambro’s robust dissent in Philadelphia News,2 and is arguably more aligned with mainstream bankruptcy thinking on credit bidding issues.

The July 6, 2011 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Board of Directors (the “FDIC Board”) meeting marked the changing of the guard from Chairman Sheila Bair to FDIC Vice Chairman Martin Gruenberg. Chairman Bair’s valedictory meeting was not merely ceremonial; it also covered several key developments regarding the timing of a final rule on resolution plans under section 165(d) of Title I and a final rule on the Orderly Liquidation Authority (“OLA”) under Title II.

A. RESOLUTION PLANS/ LIVING WILLS

During her lifetime, Vickie Lynn Marshall, publicly known as Anna Nicole Smith (“Vickie”), was hardly a stranger to the prying eyes of the media. Today, the late Vickie is again the subject of media coverage, this time in the context of a fifteen-year legal saga that has twice reached the United States Supreme Court.

A recently proposed rule by the Federal Reserve Board and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation would systemically impose significant bank holding companies and nonbank financial companies to submit annual resolution plans and quarterly credit exposure reports.

When a company saddled with potential environmental liabilities seeks bankruptcy protection, the goals of Chapter 11—giving the reorganized debtor a “fresh start” and fairly treating similarly situated creditors—can conflict with the goals of environmental laws, such as ensuring that the “polluter pays.” Courts have long struggled to reconcile this tension.

The Executive Office of the United States Trustee, part of the Department of Justice, has embarked on an initiative to investigate bankruptcy-related practices of the major mortgage servicers. The United States Trustees have not identified any authority to conduct an investigation beyond specific matters pertaining to individual debtors or their estates.

MERS’s authority to assign mortgages was called into question by a bankruptcy court in New York. In re Agard, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 488 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2011). In response to the servicer’s motion for relief from the automatic stay, the debtor challenged the servicer’s standing on the ground that MERS lacked the authority to assign the mortgage to the servicer. Because a state court had previously entered a judgment of foreclosure and sale in favor of the servicer, the court was compelled by the Rooker Feldman doctrine to reject the debtor’s claims.

Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc.’s pending appeal against the judgments of the UK High Court and the Court of Appeal in the so called “flip clause cases”, concerning the enforceability of flip clauses, is scheduled to be begin with Belmont Park Investments Pty Limited (Belmont Park Investments Pty Limited v BNY Corporate Trustee Services Limited and Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc (UKSC 2009/0222)) on March 1, 2011.

On 6 January 2011, the European Commission (the “Commission”) published a consultation paper on the technical details of a possible EU framework for bank recovery and resolution (the “Consultation Paper”).1 The paper follows the communication from the Commission dated 20 October 2010 on an EU framework for crisis management in the financial sector (the “Communication”).2