Section 507(b) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that if a secured creditor receives “adequate protection” for its interest in collateral held by a debtor, but that adequate protection ultimately proves insufficient, then the creditor is entitled to a “superpriority” administrative expense claim sufficient to cover any uncompensated diminution in the value of that collateral.
In Bank of America, N.A. v. Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., Case No. 08-01753 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2010), the Bankruptcy Court of the Southern District of New York was called on to decide whether Bank of America, N.A. (“BOA”) effectuated an improper setoff of $500 million shortly after Lehman Brother Holdings Inc. (“Lehman” or “LBHI”) filed its petition on September 15, 2008 (the “Petition Date”), and whether the setoff violated the automatic stay.
In a recent opinion, JELD-WEN, Inc. v. Van Brunt (In re Grossman’s Inc.), 607 F.3d 114 (3d Cir. 2010), the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit overruled its prior decision in Avellino & Bienes v. M. Frenville Co. (In re Frenville Co.), 744 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1984), which adopted the accrual test, a standard for determining the existence of a “claim” under the Bankruptcy Code.
In the last eighteen months, two Major League Baseball teams, the Chicago Cubs and the Texas Rangers, were sold in bankruptcy. Although both teams engaged in very similar processes leading up to their respective bankruptcy filings, the bankruptcy cases took very divergent paths.
In a decision that may come as a surprise to many, the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware (the “Court”) recently dismissed a derivative suit brought by a creditor on behalf of an insolvent limited liability company. See CML V, LLC v. Bax et al., 6 A.3d 238 (Del. Ch. 2010)(JetDirect Aviation Holdings, LLC, Nominal Defendant).
It is well established that the automatic stay imposed under section 362 of the United States Bankruptcy Code (the “Bankruptcy Code”) in a typical bankruptcy case applies extraterritorially. Thus, creditors of a Chapter 11 debtor are generally prohibited from exercising any remedies against a debtor or its assets anywhere in the world. Up until recently, no court had addressed the scope of the stay applicable in a Chapter 15 case.
On December 23, 2010, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the 6th Circuit, upheld the Eastern District of Kentucky’s Bankruptcy Court’s order that post petition rents, revenues or other funds derived from leased real property is property of the estate under 11 U.S.C. §541 and can be used as cash collateral under 11 U.S.C. §363. However, post petition rents can be used as cash collateral only if the debtor can provide adequate protection for the use of those rents through an existing equity cushion in the property.
In Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., --- S.Ct. ----, 2011 WL 66438 (U.S. 2011), the United States Supreme Court took up the question of whether a Chapter 13 debtor who owns his or her vehicle outright (“free and clear”) may claim an allowance for car ownership costs and thereby reduce the amount that he or she will repay creditors. In her first opinion, Justice Kagan answered simply—no. The Ransom opinion has been seen as a victory for not only credit card companies like the one involved but other creditors, as well.
The Supreme Court of Kentucky recently held that under Kentucky law, a security interest in a motor vehicle is not deemed perfected unless and until physical notation of the security interest is made on the certificate of title, pursuant to KRS 186A.190.
Late this summer, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, took on an issue of first impression – whether the fraud of one partner can be imputed to an “innocent” partner in order to render a judgment non-dischargeable.