A lawyer’s usual task is to help solve the client’s current problem: resolve a dispute; close a loan; obtain a permit; avoid a conviction; etc. Lawyers are so task oriented that some consultants advise us to have task specific engagement understandings and send dis-engagement letters when a task is complete. For bankruptcy lawyers representing individuals in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy, the task at hand is getting clients to and through a confirmed Chapter 13 plan with the promised debt relief and fresh start.
A recent Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision provides insight into “bad faith” claims-buying activity; specifically whether a creditor’s purchase of claims for the express purpose of blocking plan confirmation is permissible. In In re Fagerdala USA-Lompoc, Inc., the Court found it was—the secured creditor did not act in bad faith when it purchased a subset of all general unsecured claims and voted those claims against confirmation because it was acting to further its own economic interest as a creditor, without some extrinsic ulterior motive.
It is not unusual for a creditor of a debtor to cry foul that a non-debtor affiliate has substantial assets, but has not joined the bankruptcy. In some cases, the creditor may assert that even though its claim, on its face, is solely against the debtor, the debtor and the non-debtor conducted business as a single unit, or that the debtor indicated that the assets of the non-debtor were available to satisfy claims. In these circumstances, the creditor would like nothing more than to drag that asset-rich non-debtor into the bankruptcy to satisfy its claims. Is that possible?
Lawyers representing creditors often compete with federal government claims against the same insolvent borrower/debtor. There are several common federal statutes that impact these disputes including: 11 U.S.C. Section 507[1]; 26 U.S.C. Section 6321[2], et seq.; and 31 U.S.C.
The Supreme Court recently addressed two bankruptcy issues. In its opinion, the Court resolved a circuit split regarding the breadth of the safe harbor provision which protects certain transfers by financial institutions in connection with a securities contract. In Village at Lakeridge, the Court weighed in on the scope of appellate review and whether a bankruptcy court’s factual determination should be reviewed for clear error or de novo. These decisions are notable because they provide guidance on previously murky issues of bankruptcy law.
Judge Swain’s decision in the PROMESA Title III bankruptcy proceeding of the Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority (“PRHTA”) that a federal bankruptcy court cannot compel a municipal debtor to apply special revenues to post-petition debt service payments on special revenue bonds has generated controversy and caused some market participants to question whether, if the decision is upheld by the First Circuit on appeal, the perception that special revenue bonds have special rights in bankruptcy remains justified.
Last week, President Trump unveiled his proposal to fix our nation’s aging infrastructure. While the proposal lauded $1.5 trillion in new spending, it only included $200 billion in federal funding. To bridge this sizable gap, the plan largely relies on public private partnerships (often referred to as P3s) that can use tax-exempt bond financing.
Last week, President Trump unveiled his proposal to fix our nation’s aging infrastructure. While the proposal lauded $1.5 trillion in new spending, it only included $200 billion in federal funding. To bridge this sizable gap, the plan largely relies on public private partnerships (often referred to as P3s) that can use tax-exempt bond financing.
In the recently decided case, Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit took a hardline position that trademark license rights are not protected in bankruptcy. Bankruptcy Code section 365(n) permits a licensee to continue to use intellectual property even if the debtor rejects the license agreement.
InIn Re Lexington Hospitality Group, LLC, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky thwarted a lender’s efforts to control whether its borrower could file bankruptcy. As a condition to the loan, the lender mandated that the borrower’s operating agreement have certain provisions that require the affirmative vote of an “Independent Manager” and 75% of the members to authorize a bankruptcy.