In a recent decision, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York ruled that a certificateholder of two CMBS securitization trusts (“CMBS Trusts”) had no standing to be heard in a chapter 11 case involving the borrowers under a securitized mortgage loan held by the CMBS Trusts.
On March 15, 2011, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (“NPR”) to implement certain orderly liquidation authority (“OLA”) provisions of Title II of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the “Dodd-Frank Act”).
The judgment of the Court of Appeal (the “CA”) in BNY Corporate Trustee Services Limited v Eurosail-UK 2007-3BL PLC & Ors [2011] EWCA Civ 227 was handed down on 7 March 2011.
A Cuyahoga County, Ohio trial court did not abuse its discretion when it appointed a receiver for a “defunct” foreign corporation that the trial court found “persists for the purpose of winding up its affairs in Ohio.”In re: All Cases against Sager Corporation (2010), 188 Ohio App 3d 796, appeal accepted for review (2011), 127 Ohio St. 3d 1503. The Court of Appeals found it undisputed that corporate assets existed after the foreign corporation had been dissolved, “and that these assets may afford insurance coverage to Ohioans injured by exposure to Sager’s products”.
On January 18, 2011, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) approved an interim final rule (“Interim Rule”), with request for comments, to implement certain provisions of Title II of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the “Dodd-Frank Act”).
On December 23, 2010, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the 6th Circuit, upheld the Eastern District of Kentucky’s Bankruptcy Court’s order that post petition rents, revenues or other funds derived from leased real property is property of the estate under 11 U.S.C. §541 and can be used as cash collateral under 11 U.S.C. §363. However, post petition rents can be used as cash collateral only if the debtor can provide adequate protection for the use of those rents through an existing equity cushion in the property.
In Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., --- S.Ct. ----, 2011 WL 66438 (U.S. 2011), the United States Supreme Court took up the question of whether a Chapter 13 debtor who owns his or her vehicle outright (“free and clear”) may claim an allowance for car ownership costs and thereby reduce the amount that he or she will repay creditors. In her first opinion, Justice Kagan answered simply—no. The Ransom opinion has been seen as a victory for not only credit card companies like the one involved but other creditors, as well.
The Supreme Court of Kentucky recently held that under Kentucky law, a security interest in a motor vehicle is not deemed perfected unless and until physical notation of the security interest is made on the certificate of title, pursuant to KRS 186A.190.
Late this summer, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, took on an issue of first impression – whether the fraud of one partner can be imputed to an “innocent” partner in order to render a judgment non-dischargeable.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Court recently affirmed a Bankruptcy Appellate Panel that held that a bank which loaned an individual the funds to buy a motor vehicle could not overcome the avoidance of its lien as a preferential transfer after the person filed for bankruptcy. The Court so found because the lien at issue was not perfected under Kentucky law within the time frame necessary to be considered an exception to the avoidance of preferential transfers under the Bankruptcy Code.