Under BAPCPA, enacted in 2005, a Bankruptcy Court may not approve a Chapter 13 plan which does not provide for the payment of all unsecured claims in full if the plan does not devote all of the debtor’s projected disposable income over the life of the plan to repayment of the unsecured creditors.
A recent judgment for partial dismissal by the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee reinforces that a bank, when serving as a depository of fiduciary funds, may be shielded from liability for the fiduciary’s misconduct by the powerful protections of Tennessee’s Uniform Fiduciaries Act (the “UFA”).
The Third Circuit recently held that a bankruptcy court may confirm a Chapter 11 plan that includes a sale of assets in which secured creditors are not permitted to “credit bid” for the assets. In re Philadelphia Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298 (3d Cir. 2010). In that case, the debtors in possession, companies that own and operate the Philadelphia Inquirer and Philadelphia Daily News, moved the bankruptcy court to approve bid procedures for an auction of the debtors’ assets. Id. at 302.
The Eleventh Circuit recently affirmed the avoidance of nearly $2 million in postpetition payments made by debtor Delco Oil, Inc. (the "Debtor") to its petroleum supplier Marathon Petroleum Company, LLC ("Marathon").[1] The Eleventh Circuit held that funds received by Marathon from the Debtor constituted cash collateral that the Debtor had spent without the permission of either its secured lender, CapitalSource Finance ("CapitalSource"), or the bankruptcy court and, therefore, could be avoided under sections 549(a) and 363(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code.
In In re Kohls, 2007 LEXIS 76 (Bankr NDWVa 2007), the debtor filed this adversary proceeding against the Bank to cancel indebtedness and recover damages related to a $34,864 loan that the Bank made to the Debtor on the grounds that the loan was unconscionable at the time it was executed in violation of W. Va. Code § 46A-2-121.
Many bankruptcy practitioners are familiar with the general tenet that an obligation secured only by a mortgage on the Debtor’s principal residence is immune from modification or avoidance by the Debtor. Sections 1123(b)(5) and 1322(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code protect residential mortgages from being “stripped-down” to the value of the subject real estate or subjecting the terms of the underlying obligation to modification.
What should be the remedy when a bankruptcy court holds that a security interest is avoidable as a preferential transfer, but the value of the security interest is not readily ascertainable? The Ninth Circuit recently addressed this issue in USAA Federal Savings Bank v. Thacker (In re: Taylors), 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 5793 (9th Cir. 2010). The Court held that, since the value of the security interest was not readily ascertainable, the only available remedy is for the bankruptcy court to return the security interest itself, not its value, to the bankruptcy estate.
We sent to you earlier this week an Alert on "Chrysler Bankruptcy Filing and Preliminary Impact on Suppliers." As we promised, below is an update based upon our review of the case and observations at the hearings.
Essential Supplier Motion
The Court approved treatment of essential suppliers on a temporary basis. Here is a summary of the Interim Order:
Chrysler's bankruptcy filing, which occurred on April 30, has generated considerable activity already. Baker Hostetler has been monitoring closely the Chrysler activity for our supplier clients. We attended the hearing on the first day filings, which were generally ministerial in nature. The court approved joint administration, maintenance of cash management/business forms, enforcement of automatic stay, payment of wages, and honoring of all warranties.
The Sixth Circuit recently held that section 2-702(3) of the Uniform Commercial Code (the "UCC"), which permits good faith purchasers to defeat a valid right to reclaim, does not allow a secured creditor to defeat that right.[1] The Sixth Circuit found that the security interest held by a DIP lender could not be used to defeat the right of a reclaiming creditor under the UCC or pre-BAPCPA section 546(c) of the Bankruptcy Code. This decision may impact the way bankruptcy courts consider reclamation claims under revised section 546(c) of the Bankruptcy Code.