MERS’s authority to assign mortgages was called into question by a bankruptcy court in New York. In re Agard, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 488 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2011). In response to the servicer’s motion for relief from the automatic stay, the debtor challenged the servicer’s standing on the ground that MERS lacked the authority to assign the mortgage to the servicer. Because a state court had previously entered a judgment of foreclosure and sale in favor of the servicer, the court was compelled by the Rooker Feldman doctrine to reject the debtor’s claims.

Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc.’s pending appeal against the judgments of the UK High Court and the Court of Appeal in the so called “flip clause cases”, concerning the enforceability of flip clauses, is scheduled to be begin with Belmont Park Investments Pty Limited (Belmont Park Investments Pty Limited v BNY Corporate Trustee Services Limited and Lehman Brothers Special Financing Inc (UKSC 2009/0222)) on March 1, 2011.

A Cuyahoga County, Ohio trial court did not abuse its discretion when it appointed a receiver for a “defunct” foreign corporation that the trial court found “persists for the purpose of winding up its affairs in Ohio.”In re: All Cases against Sager Corporation (2010), 188 Ohio App 3d 796, appeal accepted for review (2011), 127 Ohio St. 3d 1503. The Court of Appeals found it undisputed that corporate assets existed after the foreign corporation had been dissolved, “and that these assets may afford insurance coverage to Ohioans injured by exposure to Sager’s products”.

On 6 January 2011, the European Commission (the “Commission”) published a consultation paper on the technical details of a possible EU framework for bank recovery and resolution (the “Consultation Paper”).1 The paper follows the communication from the Commission dated 20 October 2010 on an EU framework for crisis management in the financial sector (the “Communication”).2

A degree of certainty—for the time being—has been restored for participants in the commercial lending and debt trading markets who have been tracking the appeal of a controversial 2009 fraudulent transfer decision in the TOUSA, Inc. bankruptcy case.i On February 11, 2011, Judge Gold of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida quashed (or nullified)ii the bankruptcy court’s decision, which ordered a group of lenders to disgorge $480 million received in connection with loans they extended to a joint venture involving TOUSA, Inc.

On January 24, 2011, the Honorable Dwight H. Williams, Jr. of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Alabama denied the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s (“FDIC”) request for relief from the automatic stay in the Colonial BancGroup, Inc.

In the current economic environment, many banks have lost significant capital and are under immense pressure, regulatory and otherwise, to recapitalize. Failure to recapitalize within time frames set by bank regulators can result in a bank’s seizure by its chartering authority and an FDIC receivership.

On December 23, 2010, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the 6th Circuit, upheld the Eastern District of Kentucky’s Bankruptcy Court’s order that post petition rents, revenues or other funds derived from leased real property is property of the estate under 11 U.S.C. §541 and can be used as cash collateral under 11 U.S.C. §363. However, post petition rents can be used as cash collateral only if the debtor can provide adequate protection for the use of those rents through an existing equity cushion in the property.

In Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., --- S.Ct. ----, 2011 WL 66438 (U.S. 2011), the United States Supreme Court took up the question of whether a Chapter 13 debtor who owns his or her vehicle outright (“free and clear”) may claim an allowance for car ownership costs and thereby reduce the amount that he or she will repay creditors. In her first opinion, Justice Kagan answered simply—no. The Ransom opinion has been seen as a victory for not only credit card companies like the one involved but other creditors, as well.

The Supreme Court of Kentucky recently held that under Kentucky law, a security interest in a motor vehicle is not deemed perfected unless and until physical notation of the security interest is made on the certificate of title, pursuant to KRS 186A.190.