Because no recent opinions have been published by the Delaware Bankruptcy Court, I wanted to touch on a subject that is vital in nearly every preference or fraudulent transfer case: The Statute of Limitations For A Preference Claim

A. Statute of Limitations

On May 1, 2016, BIND Therapeutics, Inc., and affiliated companies (“Debtors” or “BIND”) voluntarily filed for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.

The filing comes days after the Cambridge, Mass., company received a notice of default from lender Hercules Technology III LP, which demanded immediate payment of the $14.5 million the lender says it is owed under the loan. The Company is backed by Koch Industry Inc.’s David Koch.

– But they weren’t as oppressive as my subject line may imply.

In a 13 page decision, released April 22, 2016, Judge Gross of the Delaware Bankruptcy Court granted a motion to dismiss an adversary proceeding and sanctioned the Plaintiff – disallowing any further litigation against the defendants in the Bankruptcy Court. Judge Gross’ opinion is available here (the “Opinion”).

Recently in the Abengoa SA bankruptcy proceeding (click here to review prior post), the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware entered an order permitting Debtors to reject certain nonresidential real property leases (the “Rejection Order”).

In this case, the High Court held that the proceeds of the sale of timber and land under a timber plantation scheme were not held on trust for investors by the scheme operators, with the result that they were available to secured creditors of the scheme in priority to the investors.  In particular, the High Court found that a trust will not arise without clear intention by the parties, and a court will not infer a trust simply because it thinks it is an appropriate means of protecting or creating an interest.  When establishing a managed investment scheme, parties shou

Key points

Justice Black has confirmed in his written reasons for judgment in ReNexus Energy Ltd (subject to deed of company arrangement) [2014] NSWSC 1910 (Nexus) the utility of section 444GA to achieve debt for equity restructures of listed companies.

This case highlights that the fiduciary duty to avoid conflicts of interest in particular will be strictly adhered to, with questions of fairness or unfairness of the relevant transaction being irrelevant.  Directors are reminded of the need to take great care to manage potential risks when involved in transactions in which they are acting as director of more than one company.  In particular, directors should check the rules in the companies’ constitutions around conflict of interest and if there is any concern, disclose their interest and seek approval of the companie

Key points

First occasion where a deed administrator has sought leave under section 444GA of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (theAct) in respect of a publicly listed company. The Court granted leave for 98.2% of each shareholders’ holding in Mirabela Nickel Limited (Mirabela) to be transferred to certain unsecured creditors as part of a broader recapitalisation, under a deed of company arrangement (DOCA), without shareholder approval.  

The Court found that the appointment of voluntary administrators to a company constituted oppressive conduct under section 232 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) in circumstances where it was part of a clear strategy by the controlling shareholder to gain control of the company’s business, to the exclusion of the minority shareholders.  This case provides some useful observations on the operation of section 232, particularly around action by a parent company “of the affairs of” a subsidiary. 

The Court refused to declare an appointment of administrators invalid under section 447C of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) on the basis of a previous purportedly invalid removal of a director and alleged insufficient grounds to establish that the company was, or was likely to become insolvent.  This case illustrates the Court’s willingness to overlook technical anomalies in exercising its discretion under section 447C where the end result for the company would be the same, and a broad approach in assessing whether there are reasonable grounds to form a view that a company