On May 5, 2016, SRC Liquidation, LLC International Holdings, LLC (“Liquidating Debtor”), filed approximately 137 complaints seeking the avoidance and recovery of allegedly preferential and fraudulent transfers under Sections 547 and 550 of the Bankruptcy Code. The Liquidating Debtor also seeks to disallow claims of such preference defendants under Sections 502(d) and (j) of the Bankruptcy Code.
A recent unpublished decision, Strunck v. Figueroa, serves as a not-so-gentle reminder that sometimes an enforcement application can be “too little, too late,” and that it is imperative to be proactive to protect your rights under a divorce decree or agreement, especially when your adversary acts in bad faith. In Strunck, a 2011 divorce decree awarded the plaintiff $23,369, which was to be transferred from the defendant’s retirement account. Before the plaintiff could act to collect the $23,369, however, the defendant withdrew the money from the retirement account.
Because no recent opinions have been published by the Delaware Bankruptcy Court, I wanted to touch on a subject that is vital in nearly every preference or fraudulent transfer case: The Statute of Limitations For A Preference Claim
A. Statute of Limitations
On May 1, 2016, BIND Therapeutics, Inc., and affiliated companies (“Debtors” or “BIND”) voluntarily filed for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.
The filing comes days after the Cambridge, Mass., company received a notice of default from lender Hercules Technology III LP, which demanded immediate payment of the $14.5 million the lender says it is owed under the loan. The Company is backed by Koch Industry Inc.’s David Koch.
– But they weren’t as oppressive as my subject line may imply.
In a 13 page decision, released April 22, 2016, Judge Gross of the Delaware Bankruptcy Court granted a motion to dismiss an adversary proceeding and sanctioned the Plaintiff – disallowing any further litigation against the defendants in the Bankruptcy Court. Judge Gross’ opinion is available here (the “Opinion”).
Recently in the Abengoa SA bankruptcy proceeding (click here to review prior post), the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware entered an order permitting Debtors to reject certain nonresidential real property leases (the “Rejection Order”).
On 20 May 2015, the Supreme Court of Appeal (in the matter of African Banking Corporation of Botswana v Kariba Furniture Manufacturers & Others) clarified one of the biggest uncertainties arising out of the business rescue provisions of the Companies Act. The Court has now clarified the meaning of the term “binding offer” in a manner which not only brings clarity to the business rescue regime in general, but also will provide greater comfort to banks and other creditors.
Thanks to a decision of the Supreme Court of British Columbia released on June 13, 2013, Court-appointed receivers can now accept appointments with greater confidence that their fees and expenses incurred in passing their accounts are recoverable from the estate - or possibly from a third party who raises opposition, if no assets remain in the estate.
In Re Avant Enterprises Inc.[1], the Supreme Court of British Columbia expressed its reluctance to leave its receiver exposed in respect of costs incurred in the passing of its accounts.
INTRODUCTION
In theory, when liquidating a succession, publication formalities must be observed so that the various creditors can present themselves and claim their due. This formality also gives the successors an overall view of the assets and liabilities of the succession before deciding whether or not to accept it.
In preparing a statement supporting the determination that recusal from a bankruptcy proceeding was unnecessary, U.S. Bankruptcy Court Judge Richard E. Fehling quoted Master Sergeant Georg Hans Shultz from the television sitcom Hogan’s Heroes: “I KNOW NOTHING! NOTHING!”