On May 5, 2016, SRC Liquidation, LLC International Holdings, LLC (“Liquidating Debtor”), filed approximately 137 complaints seeking the avoidance and recovery of allegedly preferential and fraudulent transfers under Sections 547 and 550 of the Bankruptcy Code. The Liquidating Debtor also seeks to disallow claims of such preference defendants under Sections 502(d) and (j) of the Bankruptcy Code.

A recent unpublished decision, Strunck v. Figueroa, serves as a not-so-gentle reminder that sometimes an enforcement application can be “too little, too late,” and that it is imperative to be proactive to protect your rights under a divorce decree or agreement, especially when your adversary acts in bad faith. In Strunck, a 2011 divorce decree awarded the plaintiff $23,369, which was to be transferred from the defendant’s retirement account. Before the plaintiff could act to collect the $23,369, however, the defendant withdrew the money from the retirement account.

Because no recent opinions have been published by the Delaware Bankruptcy Court, I wanted to touch on a subject that is vital in nearly every preference or fraudulent transfer case: The Statute of Limitations For A Preference Claim

A. Statute of Limitations

On May 1, 2016, BIND Therapeutics, Inc., and affiliated companies (“Debtors” or “BIND”) voluntarily filed for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.

The filing comes days after the Cambridge, Mass., company received a notice of default from lender Hercules Technology III LP, which demanded immediate payment of the $14.5 million the lender says it is owed under the loan. The Company is backed by Koch Industry Inc.’s David Koch.

Article 93(2)(3) of the Spanish Insolvency Act¹ (abbrev. LC) states that companies that belong to the same group of companies as the insolvent debtor shall be regarded as parties related to such debtor.

– But they weren’t as oppressive as my subject line may imply.

In a 13 page decision, released April 22, 2016, Judge Gross of the Delaware Bankruptcy Court granted a motion to dismiss an adversary proceeding and sanctioned the Plaintiff – disallowing any further litigation against the defendants in the Bankruptcy Court. Judge Gross’ opinion is available here (the “Opinion”).

Recently in the Abengoa SA bankruptcy proceeding (click here to review prior post), the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware entered an order permitting Debtors to reject certain nonresidential real property leases (the “Rejection Order”).

1. A common problem with re financing arrangements homologated (i.e., sanctioned by a court) pursuant to the 4th additional provision of the Spanish Insolvency Act (abbrev. LCon) is becoming apparent of late where the signatories to such an arrangement undertake to open or keep open lines of credit or otherwise provide the debtor with new resources and, once such arrangement has been homologated, funding needs complementary or different to those contained in the homologated refinancing arrangement arise.

1. Está convirtiéndose en un problema usual en las refinanciaciones homologadas de la disposición adicional cuarta de la Ley Concursal (LCon) en las que los firmantes se comprometen a abrir o a mantener líneas de créditos o de alguna manera a facilitar al deudor recursos nuevos que, obtenida la aprobación judicial, se presenten luego necesidades previstas o imprevistas de financiación suplementaria o distinta de la plasmada en el acuerdo de refinanciación aprobado.

La Tesorería General de la Seguridad Social viene oponiéndose a que se le aplique el artículo 176 bis.2 de la Ley Concursal en aquellos créditos cuyo vencimiento resultara anterior a la entrada en vigor de la reforma de la citada norma. Se entiende que ha de considerarse el pago de la deuda contra la masa a su respectivo vencimiento, en aplicación de la norma que estaba en vigor cuando se generó la deuda o, al menos, cuando se reclamó por parte de la Tesorería General de la Seguridad Social dicha deuda a la administración concursal.