This is the final installment in a three-part series on letters of credit by attorneys in Fox Rothschild’s Financial Restructuring & Bankruptcy Practice. Part I focused on the advantages of letters of credit as a credit enhancement tool.

In its recently issued decision in Husky International Electronics, Inc. v. Ritz, a 7-1 majority of the Supreme Court has clarified that intentionally fraudulent transfers designed to hinder or defraud creditors can fall within the definition of “actual fraud” under Section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code and can sometimes result in corresponding liabilities being non-dischargeable in a personal bankruptcy proceeding.¹

This is the second of a three-part series on letters of credit by attorneys in Fox Rothschild’s Financial Restructuring & Bankruptcy Practice. In Part I, we focused on the advantages of letters of credit as a credit enhancement tool. Here, in Part II, we explore the use of letters of credit as collateral in bankruptcy proceedings.

From May 11 to May 13, 2016, SRC Liquidation, LLC International Holdings, LLC (“Liquidating Debtor”), unleashed yet another wave of preference actions, filing approximately 257 additional complaints seeking the avoidance and recovery of allegedly preferential and fraudulent transfers under Sections 547 and 550 of the Bankruptcy Code. The Liquidating Debtor also seeks to disallow claims of such preference defendants under Sections 502(d) and (j) of the Bankruptcy Code.

In a 9-page opinion issued in the Syntax-Brillian case on May 11, 2016, Chief Judge Brendan L. Shannon lays out three principles of law that all litigants should know (if they don’t already). A copy of the Opinion is available on the Court’s website: Here. The Opinion was issued as a ruling on the motion of Alan Levine for relief from the order accepting the first-day-declaration of Gregory F. Rayburn.

On May 5, 2016, SRC Liquidation, LLC International Holdings, LLC (“Liquidating Debtor”), filed approximately 137 complaints seeking the avoidance and recovery of allegedly preferential and fraudulent transfers under Sections 547 and 550 of the Bankruptcy Code. The Liquidating Debtor also seeks to disallow claims of such preference defendants under Sections 502(d) and (j) of the Bankruptcy Code.

A recent unpublished decision, Strunck v. Figueroa, serves as a not-so-gentle reminder that sometimes an enforcement application can be “too little, too late,” and that it is imperative to be proactive to protect your rights under a divorce decree or agreement, especially when your adversary acts in bad faith. In Strunck, a 2011 divorce decree awarded the plaintiff $23,369, which was to be transferred from the defendant’s retirement account. Before the plaintiff could act to collect the $23,369, however, the defendant withdrew the money from the retirement account.

Because no recent opinions have been published by the Delaware Bankruptcy Court, I wanted to touch on a subject that is vital in nearly every preference or fraudulent transfer case: The Statute of Limitations For A Preference Claim

A. Statute of Limitations

On May 1, 2016, BIND Therapeutics, Inc., and affiliated companies (“Debtors” or “BIND”) voluntarily filed for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.

The filing comes days after the Cambridge, Mass., company received a notice of default from lender Hercules Technology III LP, which demanded immediate payment of the $14.5 million the lender says it is owed under the loan. The Company is backed by Koch Industry Inc.’s David Koch.

In a March 29, 2016 decision,1 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (the "Court of Appeals") held that creditors are preempted from asserting state law constructive fraudulent conveyance claims by virtue of the Bankruptcy Code's "safe harbors" that, among other things, exempt transfers made in connection with a contract for the purchase, sale or loan of a security (here, in the context of a leveraged buyout ("LBO")), from being clawed back into the bankruptcy estate for distribution to creditors.