From May 11 to May 13, 2016, SRC Liquidation, LLC International Holdings, LLC (“Liquidating Debtor”), unleashed yet another wave of preference actions, filing approximately 257 additional complaints seeking the avoidance and recovery of allegedly preferential and fraudulent transfers under Sections 547 and 550 of the Bankruptcy Code. The Liquidating Debtor also seeks to disallow claims of such preference defendants under Sections 502(d) and (j) of the Bankruptcy Code.

In a 9-page opinion issued in the Syntax-Brillian case on May 11, 2016, Chief Judge Brendan L. Shannon lays out three principles of law that all litigants should know (if they don’t already). A copy of the Opinion is available on the Court’s website: Here. The Opinion was issued as a ruling on the motion of Alan Levine for relief from the order accepting the first-day-declaration of Gregory F. Rayburn.

On May 5, 2016, SRC Liquidation, LLC International Holdings, LLC (“Liquidating Debtor”), filed approximately 137 complaints seeking the avoidance and recovery of allegedly preferential and fraudulent transfers under Sections 547 and 550 of the Bankruptcy Code. The Liquidating Debtor also seeks to disallow claims of such preference defendants under Sections 502(d) and (j) of the Bankruptcy Code.

A recent unpublished decision, Strunck v. Figueroa, serves as a not-so-gentle reminder that sometimes an enforcement application can be “too little, too late,” and that it is imperative to be proactive to protect your rights under a divorce decree or agreement, especially when your adversary acts in bad faith. In Strunck, a 2011 divorce decree awarded the plaintiff $23,369, which was to be transferred from the defendant’s retirement account. Before the plaintiff could act to collect the $23,369, however, the defendant withdrew the money from the retirement account.

Because no recent opinions have been published by the Delaware Bankruptcy Court, I wanted to touch on a subject that is vital in nearly every preference or fraudulent transfer case: The Statute of Limitations For A Preference Claim

A. Statute of Limitations

On May 1, 2016, BIND Therapeutics, Inc., and affiliated companies (“Debtors” or “BIND”) voluntarily filed for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.

The filing comes days after the Cambridge, Mass., company received a notice of default from lender Hercules Technology III LP, which demanded immediate payment of the $14.5 million the lender says it is owed under the loan. The Company is backed by Koch Industry Inc.’s David Koch.

– But they weren’t as oppressive as my subject line may imply.

In a 13 page decision, released April 22, 2016, Judge Gross of the Delaware Bankruptcy Court granted a motion to dismiss an adversary proceeding and sanctioned the Plaintiff – disallowing any further litigation against the defendants in the Bankruptcy Court. Judge Gross’ opinion is available here (the “Opinion”).

Frequently a debtor’s assets are sold out of bankruptcy “free and clear” of liens and claims under §363(f).  While the Bankruptcy Code imposes limits on this ability to sell assets, it does allow the sale free and clear if “such interest is in bona fide dispute” or if the price is high enough or the holder of the adverse interest “could be compelled ... to accept a money satisfaction of such interest” or if nonbankruptcy law permits such sale free and clear of such interest.

Recently in the Abengoa SA bankruptcy proceeding (click here to review prior post), the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware entered an order permitting Debtors to reject certain nonresidential real property leases (the “Rejection Order”).

On February 5, 2016 the IRS released Chief Counsel Advice Memorandum Number 201606027 (the IRS Memo) concluding that “bad boy guarantees” may cause nonrecourse financing to become, for tax purposes, the sole recourse debt of the guarantor. This can dramatically affect the tax basis and at-risk investment of the borrowing entity’s partners or members. Non-recourse liability generally increases the tax basis and at-risk investment of all parties but recourse liability increases only that of the guarantor.