Serving as an illustration of the principal that a financial restructuring won’t save a business that has ceased to be frequented by customers, RadioShack has filed for bankruptcy for the second time in as many years. The prior case was filed in the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware as case no. 15-10197. This case is also in the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, and is case no. 17-10506.

On March 2, 2017, Cal Dive Offshore Contractors, Inc. (“Cal Dive” or “Debtor”) filed approximately 136 complaints seeking the avoidance and recovery of allegedly preferential and/or fraudulent transfers under Sections 547, 548 and 550 of the Bankruptcy Code.

In January 2017, a divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued its widely reported opinion in Marblegate Asset Management, LLC vs. Education Management Corp., in which the majority held that the “right ... to receive payment” set forth in Section 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 (TIA) prohibits only nonconsensual amendments to an indenture’s core payment terms and does not protect the practical ability of bondholders to recover payment.

Background

On February 28, 2017, Judge Sontchi of the Delaware Bankruptcy Court issued an opinion (the “Opinion”) in the Money Center of America bankruptcy – Bankr. D. Del., Case 14-10603. The Opinion is available here. This Opinion decided two separate, but similar, motions to dismiss filed by 2 entities owned by federally recognized Indian Tribes and sovereign nations (the “Tribes”).

A recent case in the Southern District of New York, U.S. Bank, NA v. T.D. Bank, NA, applied the so-called Rule of Explicitness to the allocation of recoveries among creditors outside of a bankruptcy proceeding. In the bankruptcy context, this rule requires a clear and unambiguous intention to turn over post-petition interest to senior creditors at the expense of junior creditors. The court in this case found the requisite documentary clarity to pay post-petition interest ahead of the distribution of principal.

In a decision last month, DCF Capital, LLC v. US Shale Solutions, LLC (Sup. Ct. NY Co. Jan. 24, 2017), a New York State Supreme Court justice held that a noteholder that had properly accelerated indenture debt may sue to collect that debt notwithstanding the operation of a standard no-action clause. This holding, while appealing from a noteholder perspective, may not be compelled by Section 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act on which it rests and is contrary to some prior case law.

Background

An unexpected controversy has arisen recently in the high-yield bond market, one involving limiting the available remedies following default in the wake of last year’s decision by the Southern District of New York in Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB v.

By now, both indenture trustees and offices of the U.S. Trustee around the country are undoubtedly familiar with the Southern District of New York’s 2014 opinion in the case of In re Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc., 508 B.R. 283 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (Lehman II), finding that individual committee members must establish a “substantial contribution” to the case under Section 503 of the Bankruptcy Code before the payment of their fees will be approved as part of a Chapter 11 plan. In the years since the Lehman II decision, however, U.S.

On February 21, 2017, Judge Silverstein of the Delaware Bankruptcy Court issued an opinion (the “Opinion”) in the Outer Harbor Terminal bankruptcy proceeding – Bankr. D. Del., Case 16-10283. The Opinion is available here. This Opinion decided the Debtor’s objection to a claim for breach of contract filed by Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha, Ltd. (“K Line”).

Earlier this month, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (the “Delaware Bankruptcy Court”) released an update to the Local Rules for the United States Bankruptcy Court District of Delaware (Effective February 1, 2017) (the “Local Rules”). According to Local Rule 1001-1(e), the 2017 version of the Local Rules governs all cases or proceedings filed after February 1, 2017, and also applies to proceedings pending on the effective date, except to the extent that the Court finds that it would not be feasible or would work an injustice.