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In a sudden and stunning collapse, FTX, the world’s second largest cryptocurrency exchange, run by 30-year-old Sam Bankman-Fried along with more than 130 entities affiliated with FTX, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in Delaware on Friday.[1] Separately, the Securities Commission of the Bahamas appointed a Bahamas-based provisional liquidator for the controlling FTX entity and froze its assets along with

In a decision rendered on June 6, 2022, Justice Sotomayor authored the Supreme Court’s unanimous decision in the case Siegel v. Fitzgerald, holding that a statutory increase in United States Trustee’s fees violated the “uniformity” requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause set forth in Article I, § 7, cl. 4 of the United States Constitution, which empowers Congress to establish “uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.”1  

On October 12, 2021, the U.S. Supreme Court denied, without comment, a petition for a writ of certiorari in a case challenging the doctrine of equitable mootness. Equitable mootness has been described as a “narrow doctrine by which an appellate court deems it prudent for practical reasons to forbear deciding an appeal when to grant the relief requested will undermine the finality and reliability of consummated plans of reorganization.”1 By his petition, David Hargreaves—an unsecured noteholder of debtor Nuverra Environmental Solutions Inc.

On Aug. 30, 2021, in a significant decision that paves the way for additional substantial recoveries for the victims of Bernard L. Madoff’s Ponzi scheme, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals preserved the ability of Irving H. Picard, SIPA Trustee for the liquidation of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC (BLMIS), to pursue $3.75 billion of stolen customer property currently in the hands of participants in the global financial markets.

On January 12, 2021, the Department of Justice (the “DOJ”) settled its first civil action for alleged fraud against the Paycheck Protection Program (the “PPP”) – the primary lending program under the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (“CARES”) Act for small businesses negatively impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic.

Over the past four years, midstream firms have struggled to adapt their long-standing practices and adjust their long-held expectations, which were fundamentally disrupted by the outcome of the landmark bankruptcy case, In re Sabine Oil & Gas. Midstream providers have since developed and relied on certain mechanisms and carefully drafted contract language in order to bind upstream companies and their successors in interest to obligations and restrictions contained of midstream agreements.

On December 12, 2019, the Third Circuit issued a decision in In re Odyssey Contracting Corp., finding a debtor-subcontractor had waived its right to appeal from a bankruptcy court’s order directing the prime contractor and the debtor-subcontractor to resolve an adversary proceeding in accordance with a stipulation entered into by the parties and approved by the bankruptcy court prior to trial.  This ruling has implications for all parties litigating in the Third Circuit, as the Odyssey ruling makes clear that parties who enter into stipulated agreements that depend on

The District Court for the Southern District of New York has ruled that a trustee could not amend a complaint to add federal constructive fraudulent transfer claims because those claims were preempted by the safe harbor provision of the Bankruptcy Code.[1]  The District Court found, under a plain language reading of the safe harbor provision, 11 U.S.C.

In May, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit issued a much anticipated decision in Garvin v. Cook Investments NW, SPNWY, LLC, 922 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir.

In February, following oral argument before the U.S. Supreme Court in Mission Product Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, we wrote about the hugely important trademark law issue presented by this case, namely: If a bankrupt trademark licensor “rejects” an executory trademark license agreement, does that bankruptcy action terminate the licensee’s right to continue using the licensed trademark for the remaining term of the agreement?