CLIENT PUBLICATION Financial Restructuring & Insolvency | August 9, 2016 Judge Chapman Flips the Script US Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of NY Grants Noteholders’ Motion to Dismiss Based on Lehman’s Failure to State Claim With Respect to Flip-Clause Litigation On June 28, 2016, in what essentially was a clean sweep for the noteholder and trust certificate holder defendants (the “Noteholders”), the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the “Bankruptcy Court”) granted an omnibus motion to dismiss Lehman Brothers Special Financing, Inc.’s (“LBSF
On August 1, 2016, the Association for Financial Markets in Europe (AFME) published model clauses for the contractual recognition of bail-in for the purpose of satisfying the requirements of Article 55 of the EU Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD).
The Supreme Court again will be addressing the powers of bankruptcy courts. At the end of the term, the Court granted certiorari in Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp. to decide whether a bankruptcy court may authorize the distribution of settlement proceeds in a way that violates the statutory priority scheme in the Bankruptcy Code. No. 15-649, 2016 WL 3496769 (S. Ct. June 28, 2016). The Supreme Court is expected to address this fundamental bankruptcy issue sometime early next year.
Background
On June 15, 2016, National Public Finance Guarantee Corporation, an indirect subsidiary of MBIA Inc. (“NPFG”) commenced an action in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico against the Governor of Puerto Rico and certain other officials in an action styled under the caption National Public Finance Guarantee Corporation v. Alejandro Gracia Padilla et. al, No.
In the first decision, on June 9, 2016, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico that Puerto Rico and the United States are not separate sovereigns for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause contained in the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution in the appeal styled under the caption Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, No. 15-108. Opinion.
On 12 February 2016 Snowden J handed down his judgment in Indah Kiat International Finance Company B.V. [2016] EWHC 246 (Ch). Indah Kiat International Finance Company B.V. ("Indah Kiat"), part of the global Asia Pulp & Paper Group (one of the world's largest pulp and paper manufacturers), applied for an order convening a meeting of scheme creditors to consider and, if thought fit, approve a proposed scheme of arrangement (the "Scheme") under Part 26 of the Companies Act 2006.
In a June 3, 2016 decision1 , the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (“the Bankruptcy Court”) invalidated, on federal public policy grounds, a provision in the debtorLLC’s operating agreement that it viewed as hindering the LLC’s right to file for bankruptcy. Such provision provided that the consent of all members of the LLC, including a creditor holding a so-called “golden share” received pursuant to a forbearance agreement, was required for the debtor to commence a voluntary bankruptcy case.
One of the goals of the Bankruptcy Code is to provide a debtor with a fresh start. The discharge of prepetition debts at the conclusion of a bankruptcy case is one of the most important ways to attain this fresh start. On May 16, 2016, the Supreme Court made it harder for debtors to obtain a fresh start by broadening an exception to discharge.
In its recently issued decision in Husky International Electronics, Inc. v. Ritz, a 7-1 majority of the Supreme Court has clarified that intentionally fraudulent transfers designed to hinder or defraud creditors can fall within the definition of “actual fraud” under Section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code and can sometimes result in corresponding liabilities being non-dischargeable in a personal bankruptcy proceeding.1
Earlier this year, we covered Judge Shelley Chapman’s ruling in the Sabine bankruptcy, permitting the Debtors to reject a handful of gathering and other midstream agreements. Previously, Judge Chapman permitted rejection on the grounds that the Debtors exercised their reasonable business judgement in doing so.