The issue of how causation can be established has been one significant debate in Australian securities class actions involving alleged breaches of the Corporations Act by corporations. It has been unresolved whether shareholders must prove individual reliance on the contravening conduct of companies, or if the conduct affects the market price of shares purchased and/or sold by shareholders is sufficient.
In Walchuk Estate v. Houghton, the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed a motion to quash an appeal on the basis that the lower court’s adjournment of a contempt motion was a final order. The decision also provides guidance, yet again, on the proper test for distinguishing between final and interlocutory orders.
Background
Section 440D imposes a stay on “proceedings in a court” against a company whilst it is in administration under Part 5.3A of the Corporations Act. It is well established that the term “proceedings in a court” does not include an arbitration proceeding: see Larkden Pty Limited v Lloyd Energy Systems Pty Limited [2011] NSWSC 1305 at [42] (Hammerschlag J). Notwithstanding this, can the Court use its general power to make orders under s447A to extend the reach of s440D in order to impose a stay on an arbitration against a company in administration?
The media have been paying considerable attention to the current financial distress of the energy industry in Alberta, focusing primarily on the impact a company’s financial condition can have on its stakeholders, including its employees, shareholders and creditors. But there is another group that is also being affected: counterparties to commercial arrangements with insolvent companies. Increasingly, financially strong companies are having to deal with insolvent joint venture partners, financially distressed operators, and bankrupt lessees.
The recent Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia decision of Templeton v Australian Securities and Investment Commission [2015] FCAFC 137 has considered the application of 'proportionality' in determining receivers' remuneration.
Update on McCabes' article " 'Are we there yet' - When are proceedings over for the purposes of enforcement"
The High Court of Australia has refused an application for special leave to appeal the decision of the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia in Sarks v Cassegrain [2015] FCAFC 38, confirming that a judgment issued by the Court on the basis of filing of a certificate of costs assessment is a "final judgment" for the purposes of s 40(1)(g) of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) and can therefore ground a bankruptcy notice.
In a proceeding under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (“CCAA”), a judge has discretionary powers to, among other things, order debtor companies into bankruptcy and thereby resolve priority disputes. What should be the standard of review of such discretionary decisions? Historically, the standard has been high.
It is not uncommon for companies served with wind up proceedings to appoint external administrators for the purposes of investigating the affairs of the company and so that recommendations can be made to creditors to either have the company wound up, execute a deed of company arrangement or hand the company back into the control of directors.
In circumstances where the administrators conclude that the company should be wound up, it is common for the administrators to seek to be appointed as the official liquidators of the company.
In so far as they relates to creditor's statutory demands, the provisions of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) are construed by the courts particularly prescriptively.
On 5 June 2015, His Honour Justice Brereton delivered judgment in In the matter of Unity Resources Group Australia Pty Limited [2015] NSWSC 1174. This is another example of the technical application of these sections by the court.
Following the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Sun Indalex Finance, LLC v. United Steelworkers, [2013] 1 S.C.R. 271 (Indalex), creditors and their advisors have been closely following jurisprudence which considers the scope of the decision.