When public institutions are suffering from financial deficits, one question is usually raised: can they sell art to survive? In the museum world it is generally understood that you are to deaccession art only if the work is duplicative of another work in the collection, or for similar collections-related reasons, and the sale proceeds are used exclusively for collections activities. Therefore, for example, you cannot seek to sell art to obtain sufficient liquidity to meet any financial obligation, or make debt service payments.
In a decision rendered on August 15, 2013, the Ontario Court of Appeal in Re Nortel denied a motion for leave to appeal in a CCAA proceeding, reiterating the stringent test for leave to appeal in such circumstances. More importantly for our purposes, the court reiterated the necessity for a motion for leave to adduce fresh evidence where the moving party seeks to rely upon such evidence.
In re Majestic Star Casino, LLC, F.3d 736 (3rd Cir. 2013), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit broke from other courts by holding that S corporation status (or "qualified subchapter S subsidiary" or "QSub" status) is not property of the estate of the S corporation's bankruptcy estate. Other Circuits have routinely held that entity tax status is property of the estate.
In Sun Capital Partners III, L.P. et al. v. New England Teamsters & Trucking Industry Pension Fund, No. 12-2312, 2013 WL 3814985 (1st Cir. July 24, 2013), the First Circuit held that a private equity fund could be liable for its bankrupt portfolio company’s withdrawal liability imposed under Title IV of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended (“ERISA”) on the basis of the private equity fund constituting a “trade or business” under ERISA’s controlled group rules.
The test for granting leave to appeal in Companies Creditors’ Arrangement Act proceedings is well-settled:
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware (the “Court”) recently upheld a $23.7 million make-whole payment (the “Make-Whole Payment”) in In re School Specialty (Case No. 13-10125), denying the assertion by the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (the “Committee”) that the fee is unenforceable under the United States Bankruptcy Code and applicable state law.
Secured lenders often resort to non-judicial foreclosure sales of personal property upon a borrower’s default. Article 9, Part 6 of the Uniform Commercial Code requires that every aspect of such a sale must be commercially reasonable. However, the courts have historically provided little guidance as to what exactly constitutes a commercially reasonable sale. Fortunately, the Delaware Chancery Court recently issued a decision, entitled Edgewater Growth Capital Partners, L.P. v. H.I.G. Capital, Inc., C.A. No. 3601-CS (Del.Ch. Apr.
In Kasten Energy Inc. v. Shamrock Oil & Gas Ltd., 2013 ABQB 63, the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench considered the application of Kasten Energy Inc. (“Kasten”) to appoint a receiver over all of the assets and undertakings of Shamrock Oil & Gas Ltd. (“Shamrock”). The decision in this case presents a useful and concise summary of the applicable test for the appointment of a receiver.
On April 30, 2013, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the bankruptcy court has authority to recharacterize as equity, rather than debt, advances of funds made purportedly as a loan to the recipient prior to its bankruptcy. In re Fitness Holdings International, Inc., --- F.3d ----, 2013 WL 1800000 (9th Cir. 2013).