In our recent article, Jevic: Breathing New Life Into Priority Disputes, we discussed the then-pending motions for settlement and dismissal inIn re Constellation Enterprises LLC,et al.,16-bk- 11213 (CSS) (D. Del.). Constellation’s settlement motion proposed to transfer assets to the General Unsecured Creditor Trust over the claims of priority creditors and faced strong opposition in the wake of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Czyzewski et al., v. Jevic Holding Corp., et al., 137 S.

In our article, Jevic: The Supreme Court Gives Structure to Chapter 11 Structured Dismissal, we discussed the narrow holding of Czyzewski et al., v. Jevic Holding Corp., et al., 137 S. Ct. 973, 985 (2017) (“Jevic”), which prohibits non-consensual structured dismissals that violate the Bankruptcy Code’s priority principles.

On May 3, 2017, the Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico (the “Oversight Board”), acting on behalf of the cash-strapped Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (the “Commonwealth”), filed for bankruptcy protection in the District Court for the District of Puerto Rico. The Commonwealth’s Title III Petition for Covered Territory or Covered Instrumentality (the “Petition”) was filed in accordance with Title III of the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (“PROMESA”), codified at 48 U.S.C. § 2161, et seq.

In this Update

• on April 24, 2017, the Alberta Court of Appeal affirmed the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench’s decision in Redwater Energy Corporation (Re), 2016 ABQB 278 (Redwater)
• reasons for the Redwater decision
• the issues in Redwater raise various important policy concerns regarding land owners, the public at large and the oil and gas industry
• background and significant implications of Redwater

Introduction

Last year we reported (here) that Alberta’s Redwater Energy Corporation decision signaled good news for lenders and noteholders secured by Alberta O&G assets because the federal Canadian Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (“BIA”) prevailed over conflicting provisions in the provincial regulations promulgated by the Alberta Energy Regulator (“AER”).

In Caetano v Quality Meat Packers, 2017 ONSC 1199, Justice Belobaba of the Ontario Superior Court recently had opportunity to consider whether two representative proceedings commenced on behalf of two separate groups of employees against an insolvent employer ought to be struck because, despite the actions having been commenced within the applicable two year limitation period, the plaintiffs in those two actions had failed to obtain the necessary representation orders within the two year period.

Last year, we reported that Australia had proposed significant insolvency reforms that, in our view, are long overdue ("A Major Leap Forward for Australian Insolvency Laws").

On March 22, 2017, the Supreme Court, in Czyzewski et al., v. Jevic Holding Corp., et al., confirmed that the Bankruptcy Code does not permit “priority skipping” in Chapter 11 structured dismissals. In doing so, the Court held that, although the Code does not explicitly provide what, if any, priority rules apply to the distribution of estate assets in a Chapter 11 structured dismissal, “[a] distribution scheme in connection with the dismissal of a Chapter 11 case cannot, without the consent of the affected parties, deviate from the basic priority rules that apply under the . . .

Reversing the lower courts, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has today held that, under New York law (which governs 95% of all indentures), the early repayment of indenture notes in Chapter 11 is an optional redemption requiring the payment of make-whole notwithstanding the automatic acceleration of the notes due to the Chapter 11 filing. Delaware Trust Co. v. Energy Future Intermediate Holding Company LLC (In re Energy Future Holdings Corp.), Case No. 16-1251 (5th Cir. Nov. 17, 2016).

In Essar Steel Algoma Inc. (Re), Justice David Brown of the Ontario Court of Appeal held that the ambit of orders “made under” the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36 (the “CCAA”), and thus requiring leave to be appealed, is broad. Though concluding that the appellant in this case required leave to appeal, he nonetheless ordered the leave motion be expedited.