A recent unpublished decision, Strunck v. Figueroa, serves as a not-so-gentle reminder that sometimes an enforcement application can be “too little, too late,” and that it is imperative to be proactive to protect your rights under a divorce decree or agreement, especially when your adversary acts in bad faith. In Strunck, a 2011 divorce decree awarded the plaintiff $23,369, which was to be transferred from the defendant’s retirement account. Before the plaintiff could act to collect the $23,369, however, the defendant withdrew the money from the retirement account.

Because no recent opinions have been published by the Delaware Bankruptcy Court, I wanted to touch on a subject that is vital in nearly every preference or fraudulent transfer case: The Statute of Limitations For A Preference Claim

A. Statute of Limitations

On May 1, 2016, BIND Therapeutics, Inc., and affiliated companies (“Debtors” or “BIND”) voluntarily filed for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.

The filing comes days after the Cambridge, Mass., company received a notice of default from lender Hercules Technology III LP, which demanded immediate payment of the $14.5 million the lender says it is owed under the loan. The Company is backed by Koch Industry Inc.’s David Koch.

– But they weren’t as oppressive as my subject line may imply.

In a 13 page decision, released April 22, 2016, Judge Gross of the Delaware Bankruptcy Court granted a motion to dismiss an adversary proceeding and sanctioned the Plaintiff – disallowing any further litigation against the defendants in the Bankruptcy Court. Judge Gross’ opinion is available here (the “Opinion”).

Recently in the Abengoa SA bankruptcy proceeding (click here to review prior post), the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware entered an order permitting Debtors to reject certain nonresidential real property leases (the “Rejection Order”).

In Walchuk Estate v. Houghton, the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed a motion to quash an appeal on the basis that the lower court’s adjournment of a contempt motion was a final order. The decision also provides guidance, yet again, on the proper test for distinguishing between final and interlocutory orders.

Background

The media have been paying considerable attention to the current financial distress of the energy industry in Alberta, focusing primarily on the impact a company’s financial condition can have on its stakeholders, including its employees, shareholders and creditors. But there is another group that is also being affected: counterparties to commercial arrangements with insolvent companies. Increasingly, financially strong companies are having to deal with insolvent joint venture partners, financially distressed operators, and bankrupt lessees.

In a proceeding under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (“CCAA”), a judge has discretionary powers to, among other things, order debtor companies into bankruptcy and thereby resolve priority disputes. What should be the standard of review of such discretionary decisions? Historically, the standard has been high.

Following the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Sun Indalex Finance, LLC v. United Steelworkers, [2013] 1 S.C.R. 271 (Indalex), creditors and their advisors have been closely following jurisprudence which considers the scope of the decision.

In his November 20, 2014 decision in CanaSea PetroGas Group Holdings Limited (Re), Sharpe J.A. of the Ontario Court of Appeal did not accept the respondents’ submissions that he should decline to hear an application for leave to appeal a CCAA decision because only a three-judge panel should hear such an application.