In a recent High Court case, a liquidator sought an order declaring that certain payments made by a company prior to its liquidation were a ‘fraudulent preference’ and invalid. The company had made payments to its overdrawn bank account which was personally guaranteed by one of its directors. It was alleged that the payments were made in order to reduce the company’s overdraft and therefore, the director’s own personal exposure under the guarantees.
The term “pre-pack”, as it relates to insolvency sales, can have different meanings in different jurisdictions. In essence it refers to a sale of a distressed company or asset where the purchaser or investor has been identified and the terms of the sale have been fully negotiated before an insolvency process occurs. The advantage to the “pre-pack” structure is that the sale can be completed immediately upon or closely after the appointment of the insolvency office holder and, critically, without material interruption to the trading activity of the target company or asset.
The Central Bank of Ireland (the “Central Bank”) has declared its intention to strengthen the protection of client assets and has now published its “Review of the Regulatory Regime for the Safeguarding of Client Assets” (the “Review”).
The Review identifies three main objectives which should form the basis of a client asset protection regime:
The usage of pre-pack insolvency sales is less developed in Ireland than in other jurisdictions, but there has been an increasing number of asset sales structured through pre-pack receiverships over the last year. The most recent successful example was the sale of the A-Wear retail chain by its receiver Jim Luby of McStay Luby. In July 2011 the Superquinn grocery chain was sold to Musgraves by its receivers Kieran Wallace and Eamonn Richardson of KPMG, in what was probably the largest ever pre-pack transaction in this market.
Once a company has entered into a formal insolvency process, all its assets must be realised and distributed in accordance with the Companies Acts. An attempt to prefer a particular creditor up to two years prior to an insolvent liquidation can be declared void by the courts on the application of the liquidator of the insolvent company. To succeed on such an application, however, the liquidator must prove that the dominant intention of the insolvent company at the time it entered into the transaction was to prefer the creditor in question.
The object of this article is to analyze a controversial issue which is considered in recent times by the Mercantile Courts as a current incident involved in the Bankruptcy Proceedings and more specifically, to analyze the Judgement issued by the Court of First Instance no. 9 and Mercantile Court of Cordoba dated April, 19th 2010, in which the aforementioned incident is involved.
This incident is essentially based on establishing the treatment that should be granted to the additional guarantees provided by third parties in bankruptcy proceedings.
Recently the German Federal Government introduced a reform of the German Insolvency Code by adopting a draft bill of an Act to Further Facilitate the Restructuring of Businesses (the “Bill”). The Bill primarily focuses on the facilitation of insolvency plans as a tool for restructurings and to eliminate certain obstacles of the German insolvency law. If enacted as proposed, the Bill would simplify the purchase of shares of an insolvent company and would give investors more influence and flexibility in in-solvency plan proceedings.
INSOLVENCY PLANS