The Personal Insolvency Bill has completed its passage through the Dáil and the Seanad (the Irish Houses of Parliament) and will now be passed to the President for signing into law.
The new legislation has been described by the Minister for Justice as “the most radical and comprehensive reform of our insolvency and bankruptcy law and practice since the foundation of the State.”
It provides for:
In a measured opinion hewing closely to standard principles of contract interpretation, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 12-105, slip op. (2d Cir. Oct. 26, 2012), rejected the notion that a sovereign may issue bonds governed by New York state law and subject to the jurisdiction of the state’s courts, and then restructure those bonds in a manner that violates New York state law.
An application by Quinn family members to have court-appointed receivers removed and their solicitors discharged on the basis of an alleged conflict of interest and partiality has been dismissed by the Commercial Court.
Becoming the first Court of Appeals to address an issue that has divided the bankruptcy and district courts, the Ninth Circuit adopted a forceful view of Stern v. Marshall,1 to hold in In re Bellingham Insurance Agency, Inc.2 that absent the parties’ consent, the limitations imposed by Article III of the Constitution deprive a bankruptcy judge of the constitutional authority to enter judgment on fraudulent transfer claims brought against parties who have not filed proofs of claim.
The Personal Insolvency Bill has completed its passage through the Dáil (lower house of the Oireachtas (the Irish Parliament)). The Bill is now moving through the Seanad (upper house of the Oireachtas), where its provisions are subject to debate and amendment. The Minister for Justice recently confirmed his intention that the Bill will become law by Christmas.
The Bill provides for:
In a recent High Court case, a liquidator sought an order declaring that certain payments made by a company prior to its liquidation were a ‘fraudulent preference’ and invalid. The company had made payments to its overdrawn bank account which was personally guaranteed by one of its directors. It was alleged that the payments were made in order to reduce the company’s overdraft and therefore, the director’s own personal exposure under the guarantees.
Law Decree No. 83/2012, providing “Urgent Measures for the Country's Development”
Law Decree No. 83 of 22 June 2012 (the “Decree”), effective as from 26 June 2012 and converted into law with amendments1, has introduced important measures aimed at stimulating the Italian economy (also referred to as “Decreto Sviluppo”).
The Decree, consisting of seventy articles, sets forth a heterogeneous set of rules, including, among other provisions, significant amendments to the Italian Bankruptcy Law.2
In a surprising decision certain to reinvigorate the ongoing debate about the scope of Stern v. Marshall, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011), the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted a broad view of Stern and held that the structural nature of the limitations imposed on bankruptcy courts by Article III of the Constitution could not be waived by a party’s failure to object at the trial court level. The decision, Waldman v. Stone, 2012 WL 5275241 (6th Cir. Oct.
On June 13, 2012, the bankruptcy court for the Northern District of Texas in In re Vitro, S.A.B. de C.V. (“Vitro SAB”) declined to recognize and enforce an order issued by the Federal District Court for Civil and Labor Matters for the State of León, Mexico, which approved Vitro SAB’s reorganization plan in its Mexican insolvency proceeding (known as a concurso mercantil proceeding). Vitro S.A.B. v. ACP Master Fund, Ltd., et al. (In re Vitro S.A.B.), Case No. 11–33335 (HDH), 2012 WL 2138112 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. June 13, 2012).
Admonishing that motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim must be decided based on whether a plaintiff's complaint is plausible rather than how plausible it is, which was the district's view in granting a dismissal motion, the Second Circuit, in Anderson News, L.L.C. v. American Media, Inc.,[1] declared improper the district court's denial of leave to file a proposed amended complaint and vacated the dismissal.