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In Re Home Payments Limited (In Liquidation) [2013] IEHC 507, an application for directions was made by the Joint Liquidators of Home Payments Limited for the liquidators’ remuneration, costs and expenses to be discharged from customer accounts.  Prior to its liquidation the company had operated as a nationwide household budgeting and bill paying company. 

On 15 April 2014 the European Parliament voted in favour of the European Commission initiative for a Regulation establishing a European Account Preservation Order (EAPO) to simplify EU cross-border debt recovery in civil and commercial matters. This legislation aims to establish a procedure whereby the courts of EU member states can issue orders preserving or “freezing” bank accounts across the EU without the need for any intervention by the courts of any other member state.

The High Court has confirmed that leave of the Court is required before an application can be brought to cross-examine an Official Assignee (In re Sean Dunne, A Bankrupt [2014] IEHC 113).

Background

In the matter of Shellware Limited (In Liquidation) 2014 IEHC 184

On 1 April 2014 Barrett J. refused an application by the Liquidator of Shellware Limited (In Liquidation) for the restriction of Mr Eoghan Breslin, a former director, under Section 150 of the Companies Act 1990. This decision also helpfully provides clarity regarding applications for an extension of time for the filing of a Report by a Liquidator to the Director of Corporation Enforcement under Section 56 of Company Law Enforcement Act 2001 (“Section 56 Report”). 

Congil Construction Limited & Companies Acts: Mannion -v- Connolly & Anor [2013] IEHC 544

On the 28 November 2013 the High Court restricted two directors of an insolvent construction company, Congil Construction Limited, for a period of five years.

The High Court and the Supreme Court recently confirmed a Scheme of Arrangement for SIAC Construction Limited (SCL) and certain related companies despite objections from a number of creditors. The creditors claimed that the exclusion of claims for penalties, interest and, in particular, damages not awarded by a certain date and the imposed waiver of subrogated claims was unfairly prejudicial.

Initial Confirmation Hearing

Successor liability is often a concern for the acquirer when purchasing substantially all of a seller’s assets.  While this risk is well known, the circumstances under which an acquirer will be found liable under the theory of successor liability are less clear.  The recent decision in Call Center Techs., Inc. v Grand Adventures Tour & Travel Pub. Corp., 2014 U.S. Dist. Lexis 29057, 2014 WL 85934 (D. Conn. 2014), sheds helpful light on this issue by defining the continuity of enterprise theory of successor liability.

Law360, New York (March 25, 2014, 1:21 PM ET) -- On Feb. 11, the three private plaintiff-appellants and 11 state plaintiff-appellants in State National Bank of Big Spring et al. v. Jacob J. Lew et al. filed briefs with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in their appeal of the district court’s decision that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge certain provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).

On Feb. 11, the three private plaintiff- appellants and 11 state plaintiff-appellants in State National Bank of Big Spring et al. v. Jacob J. Lew et al. filed briefs with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in their appeal of the district court’s decision that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge certain provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).

On February 11th, the three private plaintiff-appellants and eleven State plaintiff-appellants in State National Bank of Big Spring, et al. v. Jacob J. Lew, et al. filed briefs with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in their appeal of the District Court’s decision that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge certain provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (the “Dodd-Frank Act” or the “Act”).