We have blogged previously about the intersection of fraud and bankruptcy.

In Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 144 S. Ct. 2071 (2024) (“Purdue”), the Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code does not authorize nonconsensual releases of nondebtors as part of a chapter 11 plan. The Court narrowly read the Code’s language, providing that a plan may “include any other appropriate provision not inconsistent with the applicable provisions of this title,” 11 U.S.C.

The BC Court of Appeal has confirmed the jurisdiction for Canadian courts to make reverse vesting orders (“RVO”) in receivership proceedings. British Columbia v.

BP Canada Energy Group ULC (“BP”) has applied for leave to appeal a decision under section 13 of the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (the “CCAA”) and for a stay of the orders rendered by Justice Yamauchi on April 24, 2024

On June 27, 2024, the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Harrington v. Purdue Pharma LP, addressing the question of whether a company can use bankruptcy to resolve the liability of non-debtor third parties. The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, held that the bankruptcy code does not authorize a release and an injunction that, as part of a plan of reorganization under Chapter 11, effectively seek to discharge the claims against a nondebtor without the consent of the affected claimants.

On June 27, 2024, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 603 U.S. ____ (2024) holding that the Bankruptcy Code does not allow for the inclusion of non-consensual third-party releases in chapter 11 plans. This decision settles a long-standing circuit split on the propriety of such releases and clarifies that a plan may not provide for the release of claims against non-debtors without the consent of the claimants.

This article originally appeared in The Bankruptcy Strategist.

To file bankruptcy in the U.S., a debtor must reside in, have a domicile or a place of business in, or have property in the United States. 11 U.S.C. §109(a). In cross border Chapter 15 cases, courts have considered if a foreign debtor must satisfy that jurisdictional test.

Creditors want to recover as much money as they can from their debtors as quickly and painlessly as possible. When those debtors take steps to delay, defeat and hinder a creditor’s recovery, creditors can rely on the Fraudulent Preference Act, RSBC 1996, c. 164 (“FPA”) and the Fraudulent Conveyance Act, RSBC 1996, c. 163 (“FCA”) to set aside transactions that have that intention and effect. Generally, the FCA allows “creditors and others” to void dispositions of property designed to delay, hinder or defraud their claims.

At a hearing in mid-March, the Delaware bankruptcy court held Camshaft Capital Fund, LP, Camshaft Capital Advisors, LLC, Camshaft Capital Management (collectively, “Camshaft”) and William Cameron Morton, principal of Camshaft, in civil contempt. The case is noteworthy because the court not only imposed monetary sanctions but also ordered civil confinement to compel Camshaft and Morton to comply with the court’s prior discovery order. The court issued a supplementary opinion on April 3, 2024, after Camshaft appealed.

To file bankruptcy in the U.S., a debtor must reside in, have a domicile or a place of business in, or have property in the United States. 11 U.S.C. § 109(a). In cross border chapter 15 cases, courts have considered whether a representative of a foreign debtor must satisfy that jurisdictional test.