In Short

引子

将于2024年7月1日正式施行的《公司法》（以下简称“《新公司法》”）第二百三十二条对于“清算义务人”及“怠于履行清算义务责任”（以下简称“怠于清算责任”）进行了重大修订，无论是股份公司还是有限公司，董事都将成为法定的唯一清算义务人。该条规定的更新无疑将引发司法解释及其他配套规定的新一轮重大修改，并将对司法实践中本就争议颇多的怠于清算责任案件的裁判规则再次带来冲击。

回望我国立法沿革，在超过三十年的时间中，对于“清算义务人”及“怠于清算责任”的规定修订之繁多、体系之冲突、解释之模糊，遍观整个民商事法律体系都属罕见，并由此引发了大量“类案不同判”的现象。鉴此，笔者将结合《新公司法》的最新修改，对涉及“清算义务人”和“怠于清算责任”的规定进行系统回顾及梳理，并以此为基础对《新公司法》的新修亮点及溯及力问题进行初步分析，抛砖引玉，并求教于业界。

一、《新公司法》之前我国法律对于“清算义务人”与“怠于清算责任”的立法沿革

（一）2005年《公司法》修订之前的相关规定

A powerful tool afforded to a bankruptcy trustee or a chapter 11 debtor-in-possession ("DIP") is the power to recover pre-bankruptcy transfers that are avoidable under federal bankruptcy law (or sometimes state law) because they were either made with the intent to defraud creditors or are constructively fraudulent because the debtor-transferor received less than reasonably equivalent value in exchange and was insolvent at the time, or was rendered insolvent as a consequence of the transfer.

The scope of the Bankruptcy Code's "safe harbor" shielding certain securities, commodity, or forward-contract payments from avoidance as fraudulent transfers has long been a magnet for controversy, particularly after the U.S. Supreme Court suggested (but did not hold) in Merit Mgmt. Grp., LP v. FTI Consulting, Inc., 138 S. Ct.

Debtors in non-U.S. bankruptcy or restructuring proceedings commonly seek to shield their U.S. assets from creditor collection efforts by seeking "recognition" of those proceedings in the United States in a case under chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code. If a U.S. bankruptcy court recognizes the debtor's foreign proceeding, the Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay prevents creditor collection efforts, including the commencement or continuation of any U.S. litigation involving the debtor or its U.S. assets. A U.S.

In a 2021 ruling, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit revived nearly 100 lawsuits seeking to recover fraudulent transfers made as part of the Madoff Ponzi scheme. In one of the latest chapters in that resurrected litigation, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held in Picard v. ABN AMRO Bank NV (In re Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC), 654 B.R. 224 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.

One year ago, we wrote that 2022 would be remembered in the corporate bankruptcy world for the "crypto winter" that descended in November 2022 with the spectacular collapse of FTX Trading Ltd., Alameda Research, and approximately 130 other affiliated companies that ignited the meltdown of many other platforms, exchanges, lenders, and mining operations because they did business with FTX.

Because bankruptcy courts were created by Congress rather than under Article III of the U.S. Constitution, there is a disagreement over whether bankruptcy courts, like other federal courts, have "inherent authority" to impose sanctions for civil contempt on parties that refuse to comply with their orders. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit revisited this debate in In re Markus, 78 F.4th 554 (2nd Cir. 2023).

2018年以来，选择以庭外重组方式化解债务风险的大型民营企业逐渐变多，同时在实践中，为了固化庭外债务重组协议之效力，越来越多企业根据自身需要，寻求以庭外重组与庭内重组相结合的、综合性化解债务危机的路径。在这样的现实背景下，对庭外债务重组与庭内重组程序的衔接及组合运用进行研究便显得十分必要了。本文将结合我国相关政策规定和案例实践，探讨庭外债务重组与庭内重组程序衔接的合理性、可行性以及两者进行衔接的模式。

一、庭外重组与庭内重组程序的现实需求

庭外重组与庭内重组（包括破产重整和破产和解）均为化解债务风险的路径。庭内重组通过破产法规定及司法权力介入等形式，赋予了重整计划或和解协议“多数决”的强制约束力，以及解封解押等的强制执行力。但庭外重组实质是债务人与主要债权人私下自愿协商，或者在中立第三人主持下达成债务调整合意的过程，达成的合意不具有司法强制执行力。

目前庭外债务重组的表决程序尚没有明确的强制性规定，其实质是债权人和债务人之间的协商合意，在债务人与债权人“单对单”的重组场景下，由债务人和债权人协商重组条件、签署重组文件，相关重组文件可以发生对债务人和债权人的约束。但在大型企业整体债务重组中，涉及较多的债务重组主体和数量较多的债权人。在各债权人存在不同诉求的情况下，可能无法达到百分之百债权人同意方案、签署重组协议，故如何高效、快速地完成整体重组方案的表决，以及表决通过的重组方案对投弃权票甚至明确反对的债权人是否有约束力，是债务重组实践中债务人和债权人均会关心且经常面临的实际问题。

一、庭外债务重组方案表决的程序探讨

（一）重组方案的表决程序概述