Courts disagree over whether a foreign bankruptcy case can be recognized under chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code if the foreign debtor does not reside or have assets or a place of business in the United States. In 2013, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit staked out its position on this issue in Drawbridge Special Opportunities Fund LP v. Barnet (In re Barnet), 737 F.3d 238 (2d Cir. 2013), ruling that the provision of the Bankruptcy Code requiring U.S. residency, assets, or a place of business applies in chapter 15 cases as well as cases filed under other chapters.
The Bankruptcy Code confers "administrative expense" priority status on the claims of vendors for the value of goods that are shipped in the ordinary course of business and received by a debtor within 20 days of filing for bankruptcy. It also provides vendors and other creditors with various defenses to the avoidance of preferential payments received from the debtor during anywhere from 90 days to one year before filing for bankruptcy, depending upon whether the creditor is an "insider" of the debtor.
The finality of sales of assets in bankruptcy is an indispensable feature of U.S. bankruptcy law, designed to maximize the value of a bankruptcy estate as expeditiously as possible for the benefit of all stakeholders. Promoting the finality of bankruptcy asset sales is the Bankruptcy Code's prohibition of reversal or modification on appeal of an order approving a sale to a good-faith purchaser unless the party challenging the sale obtains a stay pending appeal. This bar of appellate review is commonly referred to as "statutory mootness."
Chapter 15 petitions seeking recognition in the United States of foreign bankruptcy proceedings have increased significantly during the more than 16 years since chapter 15 was enacted in 2005. Among the relief commonly sought in such cases is discovery concerning the debtor's assets or asset transfers involving U.S.-based entities. A nonprecedential ruling recently handed down by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has created a circuit split on the issue of whether discovery orders entered by a U.S. bankruptcy court in a chapter 15 case are immediately appealable.
In Kaye v. Blue Bell Creameries, Inc. (In re BFW Liquidation, LLC), 899 F.3d 1178 (11th Cir. 2018), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit broadened the scope of section 547(c)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code’s "subsequent new value" defense against preference actions by holding that the provision applies to all new value supplied by the creditor during the preference period and not merely to new value that remains unpaid on the bankruptcy petition date.
In Bennett v. Jefferson County, Alabama, 899 F.3d 1240 (11th Cir. 2018), a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ruled as a matter of first impression that the doctrine of equitable mootness applies in chapter 9 cases. According to the Eleventh Circuit panel, "[T]he correct result is to join the Sixth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit B.A.P.
On February 27, 2018, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a highly anticipated ruling resolving a long-standing circuit split over the scope of the Bankruptcy Code’s "safe harbor" provision exempting certain securities transaction payments from avoidance as fraudulent transfers. In Merit Management Group LP v. FTI Consulting Inc., 2018 BL 65569, No. 16-784 (U.S. Feb.
In Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson, No. 16-348, 2017 BL 161314 (U.S. May 15, 2017), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a credit collection agency does not violate the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA") when it files a claim in a bankruptcy case to collect on a debt which would be time-barred in another court.
In Beem v. Ferguson (In re Ferguson), 2017 BL 101650 (11th Cir. Mar. 30, 2017), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit addressed the distinction between constitutional mootness (a jurisdictional issue that precludes court review of an appeal) and equitable mootness (which allows a court to exercise its discretion to refuse to hear an appeal under certain circumstances). The Eleventh Circuit ruled that an appeal from an order confirming a chapter 11 plan was not constitutionally moot because an "actual case or controversy" existed.
In 1994, Congress amended the Bankruptcy Code to add section 1123(d), which provides that, if a chapter 11 plan proposes to "cure" a default under a contract, the cure amount must be determined in accordance with the underlying agreement and applicable nonbankruptcy law. Since then, a substantial majority of courts, including the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, have held that such a cure amount must include any default-rate interest required under either the contract or applicable nonbankruptcy law.