Section 510(b) of the Bankruptcy Code provides a mechanism designed to preserve the creditor/shareholder risk allocation paradigm by categorically subordinating most types of claims asserted against a debtor by equityholders in respect of their equity holdings. However, courts do not always agree on the scope of this provision in attempting to implement its underlying policy objectives. In In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., 2017 WL 1718438 (2d Cir.

In In re Abeinsa Holding, Inc., 2016 BL 335099 (Bankr. D. Del. Oct. 6, 2016), the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware addressed what it perceived to be a flaw in the approach that many courts apply to motions for relief from the automatic stay.

One of the primary fights underlying assumption of an unexpired lease or executory contract has long been over whether any debtor breaches under the agreement are “curable.” Before the 2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, courts were split over whether historic nonmonetary breaches (such as a failure to maintain cash reserves or prescribed hours of operation) undermined a debtor’s ability to assume the lease or contract.

Over the past five years, courts have issued rulings of potential concern to buyers of distressed debt. Courts have addressed, among other things, “loan to own” acquisition strategies resulting in vote designation; equitable subordination, disallowance, and other lender liability exposure based upon the claim seller’s misconduct; disclosure requirements for ad hoc committees of debtholders; the adequacy of standardized claims-trading agreements; and claim-filing requirements in the era of computerized records.

For the third time in as many years, the Delaware Chancery Court has handed down an important ruling interpreting the interaction between federal bankruptcy law and Delaware corporate law. The thorny question this time was whether a bankruptcy court’s determination that the directors of a corporation acted in good faith when they authorized a chapter 11 filing precluded a subsequent claim that the directors breached their fiduciary duties by doing so. The Delaware Chancery Court concluded that it did, ruling in Nelson v.

The ability of a chapter 11 debtor-in-possession (“DIP”) or bankruptcy trustee to assume or reject unexpired leases or contracts that are “executory” as of the bankruptcy filing date is one of the most important entitlements created by the Bankruptcy Code. It allows a DIP to rid itself of onerous contracts and to preserve contracts that can either benefit its reorganized business or be assigned to generate value for the bankruptcy estate and/or fund distributions to creditors under a chapter 11 plan.

In a significant Delaware law decision regarding creditors’ ability to sue corporate fiduciaries, the Delaware Supreme Court recently addressed the issue of whether a corporate director owes fiduciary duties to the creditors of a company that is insolvent or in the “zone of insolvency.” In North American Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, the court concluded that directors of a solvent Delaware corporation that is operating in the zone of insolvency owe their fiduciary duties to the corporation and its shareholders, and not creditors.