Section 510(b) of the Bankruptcy Code provides a mechanism designed to preserve the creditor/shareholder risk allocation paradigm by categorically subordinating most types of claims asserted against a debtor by equityholders in respect of their equity holdings. However, courts do not always agree on the scope of this provision in attempting to implement its underlying policy objectives. In In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., 2017 WL 1718438 (2d Cir.

In the March/April 2014 issue of Business Restructuring Review, we discussed a recent trend among bankruptcy courts in the Southern District of New York confirming chapter 11 plans containing provisions that treat the fees and expenses of unofficial committees or individual official committee members as administrative expenses without the need to demonstrate that the applicants made a “substantial contribution” to the estate, as required by sections 503(b)(3)(D) and 503(b)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code. See, e.g., In re AMR Corp., 497 B.R. 690 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.

Odd as it may seem, you have to plough through 122 sections of the UK Insolvency Act 1986 (the “Act”) before you finally reach the section that sets out the criteria for establishing insolvency. Section 123 of the Act lists a series of circumstances under which a company may be deemed insolvent. Some of these circumstances are factual—for example, owing a debt of more than £750 for more than 21 days after a demand for payment—but two rely on a legal test of company insolvency.

Summary

On 26 July 2012, the Pensions Regulator (the 'Regulator') issued a statement on financial support directions (FSDs) with the intention of providing further guidance and comfort with regard to the circumstances in which it will issue an FSD after a company has been placed into administration.

The recent Cour de Cassation ruling in respect of the safeguard proceedings opened by Heart of La Défense SAS ("SAS Holdco") and its parent company, Sarl Dame Luxembourg ("Dame"), overturned the earlier decision of the Paris Court of Appeal in February 2010. The decision reinstated the safeguard proceedings of the two companies that were initiated in November 2008.

Administrators will note with concern the decision of the East London Employment Tribunal in Spencer v Lehman Brothers (in administration) and Others, which suggests that administrators can be held to be personally liable for the discrimination of employees of the business in administration.

In the July/August 2010 edition of the Business Restructuring Review, we reported on an important ruling handed down by bankruptcy judge James M. Peck in the Lehman Brothers chapter 11 cases addressing the interaction between the Bankruptcy Code’s general setoff rules (set forth in section 553) and the Code’s safe harbors for financial contracts (found principally in sections 555, 556, and 559 through 562). In In re Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc., 433 B.R. 101 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.

"Safe harbors" in the Bankruptcy Code designed to insulate nondebtor parties to financial contracts from the consequences that normally ensue when a counterparty files for bankruptcy have been the focus of a considerable amount of scrutiny as part of evolving developments in the Great Recession. One of the most recent developments concerning this issue in the courts was the subject of a ruling handed down by the New York bankruptcy court presiding over the Lehman Brothers chapter 11 cases. In In re Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc., Judge James M.

There is something positively Dickensian when looking at the anti-deprivation rule (the "rule") and images come up of scribes working in dark and dismal rooms scratching their quills by dim candle light. Indeed, the rule dates back to the nineteenth century and many lawyers would be hard-pressed to explain it even if they are able to grasp the contradictions and fine distinctions thrown up by the old cases. In essence, the rule provides that a contractual provision is void if it provides for the transfer of an asset from the owner to a third party upon the insolvency of the owner.