目前对于陷入困境但仍具备重整价值及重整可行性的企业而言，破产重整是其实现风险出清和企业重生的重要方式。在破产重整中，投资人参与的主要方式包括股权投资、资产投资和债权投资等，其中股权投资为较为重要的投资方式（其基本流程如下图），本文将结合实践，从投资人视角，浅析破产重整中股权投资的机遇和风险防范，以期为投资人参与重整投资提供帮助。
图1：破产重整中股权投资基本流程图
一、重整投资的机遇
现阶段，重整投资作为“新一轮招商引资”处于重要机遇期。以上市公司重整为例，2023年7月底的数据显示其中超90%的产业投资人和财务投资人账面呈现浮盈[1]；2024年以来，截至11月，有44家上市公司被申请重整及预重整，较前一年同期增加超四成[2]。由此可见，破产重整蕴含着较多投资机会，其在目前政策环境、价值发掘、成本控制和业务整合等方面均展现出投资“机遇”。
近年来，越来越多的企业面临债务困境，由于该等企业较多成立时间久、体量巨大，且存在经营多元化、债权债务形式多样化的情形，企业资金链的断裂易引发债务风险，实践中迫切需要进行债务重组，使债权人得到受偿，让企业重获新生。从目前情况来看，信托工具越来越多地被应用于债务重组中，包括在破产重整前的债务重组阶段，也包括在破产重整阶段。根据中国信托业协会于2022年12月12日发布的《2022年3季度中国信托业发展评析》，截至2022年3季度末，我国信托资产规模余额约为21.07万亿元。另根据建信信托有限责任公司（“建信信托”）发布的《建信信托2021年年度报告》，截至2021年12月31日，建信信托破产重整服务信托规模超2,300亿元[1]；根据中信信托有限责任公司（“中信信托”）发布的《中信信托二〇二一年年度报告》，截至2021年12月31日，中信信托特殊资产服务信托业务受托规模近160亿元[2]。
In Shameeka Ien v. TransCare Corp., et al. (In re TransCareCorp.), Case No. 16-10407, Adv. P. No. 16-01033 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2020) [D.I. 157], the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York recently refused to dismiss WARN Act claims against Patriarch Partners, LLC, private equity firm (“PE Firm“), and its owner, Lynn Tilton (“PE Owner“), resulting from the staggered chapter 7 bankruptcies of several portfolio companies, TransCare Corporation and its affiliates (collectively, the “Debtors“).
Joining three other bankruptcy courts, Judge Thuma of the District of New Mexico recently held that the rules issued by the Small Business Administration (“SBA“) that restrict bankrupt entities from participating in the Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP“) violated the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, H.R. 748, P.L. 115-136 (the “CARES Act”), as well as section 525(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.
The Southern District of New York recently reminded us in In re Firestar Diamond, Inc., et al., Case No. 18-10509 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. April 22, 2019) (SHL) [Dkt. No. 1482] that equitable principles in bankruptcy often do not match those outside of bankruptcy. Indeed, bankruptcy decisions often place emphasis on equality of treatment amongst all creditors and are less concerned with inequities to individual creditors.
In Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., f/b/o Jerome Guyant, IRA v. Highland Construction Management Services, L.P. et al., Nos. 18-2450-52 (4th Cir. March 17, 2020), the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals recently upheld that a borrower’s indirect economic interests in a limited liability company (LLC) were not assigned to a lender under a conveyance in a security agreement assigning mere membership interests, pursuant to Virginia state law.
Facts
Setoff is a right that allows a creditor to offset a prepetition debt owed to a debtor with its prepetition claim against the debtor. See In re Luongo, 259 F.3d 323, 334 (5th Cir.
Setoff is a right that allows a creditor to offset a prepetition debt owed to a debtor with its prepetition claim against the debtor. See In re Luongo, 259 F.3d 323, 334 (5th Cir. 2001). This remedy is aimed at preventing the inequitable and inefficient result that occurs when a creditor is forced to pay a 100% of its prepetition debt owed to a debtor, without resolving its prepetition claim. In such circumstances, the creditor is often forced to later prosecute its unresolved claim against the debtor and is commonly only awarded a fraction of the value of its claim.
Bankruptcy and class actions each establish elaborate procedures and provide a convenient forum to resolve numerous claims against one or more defendants, in an efficient manner. However, while a class action focuses on providing adequate representation to claimants with similar claims, bankruptcy focuses on enabling an insolvent company to reorganize. The two goals do not necessarily blend well in every circumstance.