In the recent decision of Heavy Plant Leasing [2018] NSWSC 707, a creditor successfully defended an unfair preference claim by establishing it did not have reasonable grounds to suspect the insolvency of the debtor company, who was a subcontractor in the earth moving business.

The most common way of defending a liquidator’s unfair preferences claim is to rely upon section 588FG(2) of the Corporations Act 2001(Cth); commonly called the ‘good faith defence’.

Commonly, a creditor being sued by a liquidator to refund an alleged unfair preference is owed money by the company in liquidation.

Liquidators argue that under section 553(c)(1) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Act) a creditor is not able to set-off the outstanding indebtedness owed by the company to the creditor to reduce any liability of the creditor to refund any unfair preference. Similar arguments are made by liquidators in relation to insolvent trading claims.

A snapshot of the court decisions

On February 27, 2018, the United States Supreme Court resolved a circuit split regarding the proper application of the safe harbor set forth in section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code, a provision that prohibits the avoidance of a transfer if the transfer was made in connection with a securities contract and made by or to (or for the benefit of) certain qualified entities, including a financial institution.

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently held that section 1129(a)(10) of the Bankruptcy Code – a provision which, in effect, prohibits confirmation of a plan unless the plan has been accepted by at least one impaired class of claims – applies on “per plan” rather than a “per debtor” basis, even when the plan at issue covers multiple debtors. In re Transwest Resort Properties, Inc., 2018 WL 615431 (9th Cir. Jan. 25, 2018). The Court is the first circuit court to address the issue.

Just because a liquidator asserts you have received an unfair preference, does not necessarily mean you have or that there are no potential defences available to you.

Some six years after the United States Supreme Court decided Stern v. Marshall, courts continue to grapple with the decision’s meaning and how much it curtails the exercise of bankruptcy court jurisdiction.[1] The U.S.

It is common for commercial contracts to contain ipso facto clauses, which allow a party to terminate or modify the terms of the contract where the other party experiences an insolvency event. A concern addressed by the Government is that these clauses can prevent a financially distressed company from turning their situation around.

The High Court’s recent decision in Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd v Compton [2017] HCA 28 has confirmed a bankruptcy court can exercise a discretion to go behind the judgment debt where sufficient reason is shown for questioning whether there is a debt due to the petitioning creditor.

In the recent decision of Lane (Trustee), in the matter of Lee (Bankrupt) v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2017] FCA 953, Cooper Grace Ward acted for the trustee in bankruptcy, who sought directions from the Court regarding the administration of a trading trust where the bankrupt was the trustee.

Facts

Section 477(2B) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) provides that a liquidator must not enter into any sort of agreement that may last longer than three months without first obtaining approval of the Court, of the committee of inspection or by a resolution of the creditors.

Typically, a litigation funding agreement will be caught by this section because it will last more than three months.

The reference to ‘enter into an agreement’ could also catch a novation, and potentially a variation, to an agreement.