One of the primary reasons that most debtors seek bankruptcy relief is the automatic stay, which prevents creditors from pursuing collection efforts outside of the bankruptcy proceedings. Creditors can, however, seek relief from the automatic stay from the bankruptcy court under certain circumstances.

What happens in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy case when a creditor files a proof of claim involving a debt for which the statute of limitations to collect the debt has run? More specifically, does the filing of such a claim violate the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (the “Act”)? That’s the issue considered by the U.S. Supreme Court in its recent decision in the case of Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson. 1

In a recent decision, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Sixth Circuit (the “Court”) considered the issue of asset “abandonment” in a Chapter 7 case[1]. The Court reversed the bankruptcy court’s decision to allow the Chapter 7 trustee to compromise a claim that the debtor argued the trustee had abandoned.

Background

In the case of Susan G. Brown v. Douglas Ellmann [1], the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (the “Sixth Circuit”) recently affirmed a bankruptcy court’s decision to deny a Chapter 7 debtor’s proposed exemptions for the value of redemption rights she enjoyed under Michigan law related to the sale of a property she surrendered to the bankruptcy estate.

Background

On March 22, 2017, the United States Supreme Court held that bankruptcy courts cannot approve a “structured dismissal”—a dismissal with special conditions or that does something other than restoring the “prepetition financial status quo”—providing for distributions that deviate from the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme absent the consent of affected creditors. Czyzewski v.Jevic Holding Corp., No. 15-649, 580 U.S. ___ (2017), 2017 WL 1066259, at *3 (Mar. 22, 2017).

On January 17, 2017, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued its long-anticipated opinion in Marblegate Asset Management, LLC v. Education Management Finance Corp., 1 ruling that Section 316(b) of the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. § 77ppp(b) (the “Act”), prohibits only non-consensual amendments to core payment terms of bond indentures.

Many bankruptcy cases involve adversary proceedings in which creditors seek to have certain debts deemed nondischargeable. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan (the “District Court”) recently considered, on appeal, whether the Bankruptcy Court properly held that a debt owed by a debtor (the “Debtor”) to the State of Michigan Unemployment Insurance Agency (the “Agency”) is dischargeable in a Chapter 13 case.1

While bankruptcy relief is available as a tool for individuals to discharge debts, it is not available to everyone, under all circumstances. Before a debtor can, for example, discharge debts in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, he or she must prove that debts and income are within certain statutory thresholds. When determining whether an individual is eligible for relief, the nature of the debts at issue is also relevant.

State unemployment benefits are paid pursuant to a system that relies on trust. Benefits are paid based on representations made by claimants that they are out of work and that they continue to seek out full-time work. If a claimant finds part-time work, then benefits are reduced accordingly.

A recent opinion from the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Michigan (the “Court”) addresses a Chapter 7 debtor’s attempt to discharge a debt owed to the State of Michigan for overpaid unemployment benefits, and penalties and interest stemming from the overpayment.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently articulated a standard to determine what claims may be barred against a purchaser of assets "free and clear" of claims pursuant to section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code and highlighted procedural due process concerns with respect to enforcement.¹  The decision arose out of litigation regarding certain defects, including the well-known "ignition switch defect," affecting certain GM vehicles.  GM's successor (which acquired GM's assets in a section 363 sale in 2009) asserted that a "free and clear" provisi