Some six years after the United States Supreme Court decided Stern v. Marshall, courts continue to grapple with the decision’s meaning and how much it curtails the exercise of bankruptcy court jurisdiction.[1] The U.S.

Facts

A Trustee in Bankruptcy (‘TiB’) applied for committal of a bankrupt (‘B’) for contempt for repeated failure to provide financial information sought in conjunction with an application for an Income Payment Order (‘IPO’).

On March 22, 2017, the United States Supreme Court held that bankruptcy courts cannot approve a “structured dismissal”—a dismissal with special conditions or that does something other than restoring the “prepetition financial status quo”—providing for distributions that deviate from the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme absent the consent of affected creditors. Czyzewski v.Jevic Holding Corp., No. 15-649, 580 U.S. ___ (2017), 2017 WL 1066259, at *3 (Mar. 22, 2017).

Facts

C’s appeal of his bankruptcy order failed. He then argued that pursuant to r 12.2(1) of the Insolvency Rules 1986 (‘IR 12.2’) as a matter of law the costs of the unsuccessful appeal should be treated as an expense of the bankruptcy estate; alternatively they were aprovable debt in the bankruptcy. D (the PC) contended that IR 7.51A gave the court an unfettered discretion as to the form of order and sought costs against C personally as a post-bankruptcy liability.

The Grand Court has handed down an instructive judgment appointing "light-touch" provisional liquidators over Midway Resources International ("Midway"), a pan-African focused upstream oil and gas company, incorporated in the Cayman Islands. The judgment of Segal J will be of particular interest to companies considering the appointment of provisional liquidators intended to work alongside the board of directors to promote a restructuring plan, under section 104(3) of the Companies Act (2021 Revision) (the "Act").

OTL was placed into compulsory liquidation. Prior to this it transferred monies to a trust located in HK of which N was perceived to be the principal trustee. The OR as liquidator applied for an order under s 236(3) of the Insolvency Act 1986 (IA 1986) that N produce a witness statement with supporting documents in relation to the company’s affairs. The primary question for HHJ Hodge QC was whether s 236(3) of the IA 1986 could have extra-territorial effect as N was resident in HK.

Held

On March 29, 2016, the Second Circuit addressed the breadth and application of the Bankruptcy Code's safe harbor provisions in an opinion that applied to two cases before it.  The court analyzed whether: (i) the Bankruptcy Code's safe harbor provisions preempt individual creditors' state law fraudulent conveyance claims; and (ii) the automatic stay bars creditors from asserting such claims while the trustee is actively pursuing similar claims under the Bankruptcy Code.  In In re Tribune Co.

The District Court for the Central District of California recently held that an assignee that acquired rights to a terminated swap agreement was not a "swap participant" under the Bankruptcy Code and, therefore, could not invoke safe harbors based on that status to foreclose on collateral in the face of the automatic stay. ^[1] The court ruled that the assignee acquired only a right to collect payment under the swap agreement, not the assignor's rights under the Bankruptcy Code to exercise remedies without first seeking court approval.

Background

On May 21, 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (the "Third Circuit") held that in rare instances a bankruptcy court may approve a "structured dismissal"- that is, a dismissal "that winds up the bankruptcy with certain conditions attached instead of simply dismissing the case and restoring the status quo ante" - that deviates from the Bankruptcy Code's priority scheme. See Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors v. CIT Group/Business Credit Inc. (In re Jevic Holding Corp.), Case No.

On October 31, 2014, Bankruptcy Judge Kaplan of the District of New Jersey addressed two issues critically important to intellectual property licensees and purchasers: (i) can a trademark  licensee use section 365(n) of the Bankruptcy Code to keep licensed marks following a  debtor-licensor’s rejection of a license agreement?; and (ii) can a “free and clear” sale of  intellectual property eliminate any rights retained by a licensee? In re Crumbs Bake Shop, Inc., et  al., 2014 WL 5508177 (Bankr. D.N.J. Oct. 31, 2014).