The High Court’s recent decision in Ramsay Health Care Australia Pty Ltd v Compton [2017] HCA 28 has confirmed a bankruptcy court can exercise a discretion to go behind the judgment debt where sufficient reason is shown for questioning whether there is a debt due to the petitioning creditor.

The Bankruptcy Code prohibits a chapter 13 debtor from modifying a mortgage lien on the debtor's principal residence. Even in situations in which a secured creditor fails to file a proof of claim or otherwise participate in the bankruptcy proceeding, the Bankruptcy Code allows a secured creditor's lien on a primary residence to pass through the bankruptcy unaffected. However, a recent decision from a bankruptcy court in Texas illustrates the risks to secured creditors of blind reliance on these statutory protections.

In the recent decision of Lane (Trustee), in the matter of Lee (Bankrupt) v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2017] FCA 953, Cooper Grace Ward acted for the trustee in bankruptcy, who sought directions from the Court regarding the administration of a trading trust where the bankrupt was the trustee.

Facts

In March of this year, consumer electronics and home appliance retailer Gregg Appliances, Inc., better known as H.H. Gregg, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in Indianapolis, Indiana. H.H. Gregg, which took over many of the retail spaces previously occupied by Circuit City, is one of many big-box retailers that have sought Chapter 11 bankruptcy over the past several years. Like Circuit City, H.H. Gregg was unsuccessful in reorganizing in bankruptcy and is now seeking to recover payments made to vendors and other creditors within 90 days prior to the bankruptcy filing.

Major changes to bankruptcy rules that govern the administration of consumer bankruptcy cases, and Chapter 13 cases in particular, were recently approved by the Supreme Court and transmitted to Congress.1 After several years of drafting and debate by the rules committee, these rule amendments will become effective December 1, 2017.

Section 477(2B) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) provides that a liquidator must not enter into any sort of agreement that may last longer than three months without first obtaining approval of the Court, of the committee of inspection or by a resolution of the creditors.

Typically, a litigation funding agreement will be caught by this section because it will last more than three months.

The reference to ‘enter into an agreement’ could also catch a novation, and potentially a variation, to an agreement.

All Australian states have sale of goods legislation that, in certain circumstances, allows an unpaid seller to retain possession of goods in transit where the buyer becomes insolvent. The statutory right, called stoppage intransitu, is a useful remedy to obtain payment.

A registered security interest on the PPSR is not required to exercise the statutory right. Administrators and liquidators may be trumped by a notice under the stoppage in transitu provisions.

However, the sale of goods legislation is not identical in each state.

Competing claims to goods are common where there is an unpaid seller with alleged retention of title, the supplier’s customer has gone into external administration and the goods are in the possession of a transport or warehouse provider. Thrown into the mix may be an administrator or liquidator demanding possession of the goods to sell them.

The recent case of M Webster Holdings Pty Limited (administrators appointed) v Specific Freight Pty Limited [2017] FCA 269 illustrates how a transport provider can become ‘the meat in the sandwich’ when a consignee of goods becomes insolvent.

Webster, a fashion retailer, operated two well-known Australian businesses, David Lawrence and Marcs. Webster was placed into administration in February 2017 and its administrators continued to trade with a view to securing a purchaser.

On 23 March 2017, Justice Robson of the Supreme Court of Victoria declined to follow the Victorian Court of Appeal decision of Re Enhill, finding that the decision was not binding with respect to different legislation (the Companies Act 1961 (Vic) as opposed to theCorporations Act 2001 (Cth)).

Background

Since the early 1980s, there has been a divergence of judicial opinion in the decisions of Re EnhillPty Ltd [1983] 1 VR 561 and Re Suco Gold Pty Ltd (in liq) (1983) 33 SASR 99.