In the recent court decision of Trenfield v HAG Import Corporation (Australia) Pty Ltd [2018] QDC 107, the liquidators recovered unfair preferences from a retention of title creditor who argued it was a secured creditor.
The issues
In the recent decision of Heavy Plant Leasing [2018] NSWSC 707, a creditor successfully defended an unfair preference claim by establishing it did not have reasonable grounds to suspect the insolvency of the debtor company, who was a subcontractor in the earth moving business.
The most common way of defending a liquidator’s unfair preferences claim is to rely upon section 588FG(2) of the Corporations Act 2001(Cth); commonly called the ‘good faith defence’.
Commonly, a creditor being sued by a liquidator to refund an alleged unfair preference is owed money by the company in liquidation.
Liquidators argue that under section 553(c)(1) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Act) a creditor is not able to set-off the outstanding indebtedness owed by the company to the creditor to reduce any liability of the creditor to refund any unfair preference. Similar arguments are made by liquidators in relation to insolvent trading claims.
A snapshot of the court decisions
Section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code shields certain transfers involving settlement payments and other payments in connection with securities contracts (for example, payment for stock) made to certain financial intermediaries, such as banks, from avoidance as a fraudulent conveyance or preferential transfer. In recent years, several circuit courts interpreted 546(e) as applying to a transfer that flows through a financial intermediary, even if the ultimate recipient of the transfer would not qualify for the protection of 546(e).
Just because a liquidator asserts you have received an unfair preference, does not necessarily mean you have or that there are no potential defences available to you.
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