Some six years after the United States Supreme Court decided Stern v. Marshall, courts continue to grapple with the decision’s meaning and how much it curtails the exercise of bankruptcy court jurisdiction.[1] The U.S.
On March 22, 2017, the United States Supreme Court held that bankruptcy courts cannot approve a “structured dismissal”—a dismissal with special conditions or that does something other than restoring the “prepetition financial status quo”—providing for distributions that deviate from the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme absent the consent of affected creditors. Czyzewski v.Jevic Holding Corp., No. 15-649, 580 U.S. ___ (2017), 2017 WL 1066259, at *3 (Mar. 22, 2017).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently articulated a standard to determine what claims may be barred against a purchaser of assets "free and clear" of claims pursuant to section 363(f) of the Bankruptcy Code and highlighted procedural due process concerns with respect to enforcement.1 The decision arose out of litigation regarding certain defects, including the well-known "ignition switch defect," affecting certain GM vehicles. GM's successor (which acquired GM's assets in a section 363 sale in 2009) asserted that a "free and clear" provisi
On March 29, 2016, the Second Circuit addressed the breadth and application of the Bankruptcy Code's safe harbor provisions in an opinion that applied to two cases before it. The court analyzed whether: (i) the Bankruptcy Code's safe harbor provisions preempt individual creditors' state law fraudulent conveyance claims; and (ii) the automatic stay bars creditors from asserting such claims while the trustee is actively pursuing similar claims under the Bankruptcy Code. In In re Tribune Co.
Where an Administrator makes employees redundant ahead of a sale of the business, will it always be a dismissal connected with a transfer (and therefore automatically unfair), or can it ever be for "economic, technical or organisational" (ETO) reasons (and therefore potentially fair)? In Crystal Palace FC Ltd –v- Kavanagh & ors [2013] EWCA Civ 1410, the Court of Appeal found for the latter, a more pragmatic, approach. Motivation, it appears, is everything in such cases.
The role of Jersey as a financial centre means that on occasions there will be a requirement for a foreign liquidator or an office-holder under bankruptcy legislation to obtain information or documentation from persons or companies located in the Island. There have been a series of recent court decisions establishing the appropriate levels of co-operation with other jurisdictions.
A Jersey company or one of its creditors may wish the company to be placed into administration in England under Schedule B1 of the UK's Insolvency Act 1986 (the "Act").
A Jersey company or one of its creditors may wish the company to be placed into administration in England under Schedule B1 of the UK's Insolvency Act 1986 (the "Act").