The IECA has released its Master Netting Agreement, a state-of-the-art solution ensuring credit exposures are managed and netted under a single, integrated framework that is flexible and easy to implement.
Two United States courts recently issued decisions involving the scope of the Bankruptcy Code’s safe-harbor provision in section 546(e) related to avoidance actions. In one, in the Second Circuit, the court took a broad approach to protect the financial markets, whereas the Seventh Circuit interpreted that statute more narrowly. The Supreme Court is now well-positioned to bring greater clarity to this important area of law.
The power of a bankruptcy court to authorize the sale of assets “free-and-clear” of liens and any other interests is a powerful tool that is used to realize value from distressed businesses. Indeed, purchasers will occasionally insist that sellers file a chapter 11 case in order to “cleanse the assets” by conducting their sale under Bankruptcy Code § 363(b). But how far does this power reach? Can bankruptcy be used to protect the purchaser from potential successor liability claims?
New York bankruptcy judge dismisses claims to recover approximately $1 billion that had been distributed to noteholders following commencement of the Lehman Brothers chapter 11 proceedings in September 2008.
Krol v. Key Bank National Association, et al. (In re MCK Millenium Centre Parking, LLC), Adv. No. 14-00392 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 24, 2015)
A bankruptcy remote entity is a special-purpose vehicle (or special purpose entity) (“SPV”) that is formed to hold a defined group of assets and to protect them from being administered as property of a bankruptcy estate. SeePaloian v. LaSalle Bank Nat’l Assn (In re Doctors Hospital of Hyde Park, Inc.), 507 B.R. 558, 701, 702 (N.D. Ill. 2013). Bankruptcy remote entities are intended to separate the credit quality of assets upon which financing is based from the credit and bankruptcy risks of the entities involved in the financing. See id.
Loan agreements and bond indentures often contain "make-whole" provisions, which provide yield protection to lenders and investors in the event of a repayment prior to maturity. They accomplish this by requiring the borrower to pay a premium for pre-payment of a loan. This allows lenders to lock-in a guaranteed rate of return when they agree to provide financing. Borrowers also benefit since the yield protection allows lenders to offer lower interest rates or fees than they would absent such protection.
Lenders and their attorneys are conditioned to believe that being over-secured is as good as life gets for a creditor. Lenders want to secure repayment with collateral that is valuable and liquid, while their attorneys ensure that the security interest is properly perfected. But, post-closing confidence in a job well done can quickly evaporate if the borrower files a bankruptcy case intending to sell the collateral.
The ability to "surcharge" a secured creditor's collateral in bankruptcy is an important resource available to a bankruptcy trustee or chapter 11 debtor in possession ("DIP"), particularly in cases where there is little or no equity in the estate to pay administrative costs, such as the fees and expenses of estate-retained professionals. However, as demonstrated by a ruling handed down by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, the circumstances under which collateral may be surcharged are narrow. In In re Towne, Inc., 2013 BL 232068 (3d Cir. Aug.
Section 506(a) of the Bankruptcy Code contemplates bifurcation of a debtor's obligation to a secured creditor into secured and unsecured claims, depending on the value of the collateral securing the debt. The term "value," however, is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code, and bankruptcy courts vary in their approaches to the meaning of the term. In In re Heritage Highgate, Inc., 679 F.3d 132 (3d Cir.