As noted in a previous Sutherland Legal Alert, the American Bankruptcy Institute has formed a Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11 (the Commission). To further its goal of proposing changes to modernize the Bankruptcy Code, the Commission formed a number of advisory committees, including one named the Financial Contracts, Derivatives and Safe Harbors Committee (the Committee).

Debt exchanges have long been utilized by distressed companies to address liquidity concerns and to take advantage of beneficial market conditions. A company saddled with burdensome debt obligations, for example, may seek to exchange existing notes for new notes with the same outstanding principal but with borrower-favorable terms, like delayed payment or extended maturation dates (a "Face Value Exchange"). Or the company might seek to exchange existing notes for new notes with a lower face amount, motivated by discounted trading values for the existing notes (a "Fair Value Exchange").

The “safe harbor” provisions of the Bankruptcy Code protect firms that trade derivatives, and other participants in financial and commodity markets, from the rigidity that bankruptcy law imposes on most parties. Since their inception in 1982, the safe harbor statutes have gradually grown broader, to reflect a Congressional intent of protecting against secondary shocks reverberating through those markets after a major bankruptcy. The liberalizing of safe harbors traces – and may well be explained by – the rapidly expanding use of derivatives contracts generally.

One of the primary fights underlying assumption of an unexpired lease or executory contract has long been over whether any debtor breaches under the agreement are “curable.” Before the 2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, courts were split over whether historic nonmonetary breaches (such as a failure to maintain cash reserves or prescribed hours of operation) undermined a debtor’s ability to assume the lease or contract.