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On entend de manière générale que cet automne sera une période dangereuse pour de nombreuses entreprises. Et il n'est évidemment pas nécessaire de chercher bien loin pour en connaître la raison, bien que la situation économique difficile actuelle ne trouve pas sa cause unique dans la crise subie suite au Coronavirus. En tout cas, il n’y a rien d’honteux à admettre que l’on peut avoir du mal à payer tous ses fournisseurs.

It is generally accepted that the last quarter of 2020 will be a risky period for many businesses. The reason for this is not far-fetched, although it is maybe a little too easy to put all the blame on Corona. In any case, it is no longer a disgrace to have to admit problems to pay all suppliers.

During lockdown period, many companies were still able to survive with the special government coronacrisis measures. But now, as these measures are being systematically phased out, risk of bankruptcy has increased.

Het retentierecht dat reeds lang aanvaard wordt als een handig middel om alsnog betaald te worden, kreeg pas in 2018 een wettelijke basis met de nieuwe Pandwet. Onlangs kreeg het retentierecht nog een een steuntje bij van het Hof van Cassatie. 

1. Waar gaat het over?

Het retentierecht is een handig middel voor schuldeisers die niet betaald worden en in het bezit zijn van een goed van hun schuldenaar.

On 24 April 2020, Royal Decree No 15 has been published which temporarily protects companies against conservatory and enforcement attachment and bankruptcy (and judicial dissolution) and the dissolution of agreements due to non-payment.

This does not affect the obligation to pay due debts.

This temporary suspension of legal actions that may lead to insolvency applies from 24 April 2020 to 17 May 2020 for all enterprises whose continuity is threatened by the corona crisis, provided that they were not already in default on 18 March 2020.

The authorities have taken several measures to support businesses and employment, under the pressure of the corona crisis. Measures in relation to tax and social security, temporary unemployment and state financial support were taken. An agreement with the financial sector to grant payment facilities was reached, as well.

受OPEC与俄罗斯减产谈判进展及后续措施影响,3月9日开市以来原油价格强劲下行,连带其他相关大宗商品价格以同样惊人的幅度大幅下跌,朋友圈纷纷感叹“活久见”。2020年初的黑天鹅接踵而至,很难判断下一站的走势到底在哪,也难判断对国内期货等金融市场的传导究竟会到何种程度。在这个价格剧烈波动的日子,人们耳边又回响起华尔街故老相传的”Bulls make money, bears make money, pigs get slaughtered” 的残酷谚语。在目前中国境内证券期货市场中,和做空手段相对有限的股票市场相比,期货市场天然的多头-空头交易机制可以更直观的展现这句话的涵义。

1、当我们在谈论“强行平仓”和“三板强平”时,我在谈些什么?

期货交易的亏损并不仅指强行平仓带来的损失,但是面对如此惊人的市场变化,“爆仓”、“强行平仓”和“三板强平”这类期货术语或行话还是最让人屏住呼吸的字眼。与肾上腺素飙升,杀伐决断的Trader们以及或焦虑或欣慰的相关企业的关注点不同,作为律师的我们,视线停在了这些期货术语或行话背后的基础法律关系上。从机制本身出发:

Companies have a lot more international debtors as a result of globalisation and internationalisation of trade, making the recovery of debts a lot harder. It is a good thing that the law is evolving more and more towards making the recovery of international debts simpler and faster.

Suppose a Belgian company has a claim on a French buyer, but the latter refuses to pay. The Belgian company therefore wants to seize the buyer's movable assets in France. Which steps should be taken to achieve this?

Suite à la globalisation et à l’internationalisation du commerce, les entreprises se voient confrontées, de plus en plus souvent, à des débiteurs étrangers, ce qui ne rend pas le recouvrement plus facile. C’est dès lors une bonne chose que la législation évolue de plus en plus vers un recouvrement plus simple et plus facile de dettes internationales.

近年来,我国宏观经济增长放缓,国家调整产业和信贷政策,并逐渐加强金融监管,商业银行的资产质量压力有所增加,十亿甚至百亿级别的债务逾期或潜在违约浮出水面。这些巨无霸级别的潜在不良贷款风险,迫切要求商业银行审查并改善贷前贷后管理中的遗漏和问题,也对商业银行的危机处理能力提出了更高的挑战。

大敌当前,痛定思痛,当危机来临时,商业银行的管理层和执行层需要的是冷静的思考、周密的策划,以及必要时刻壮士断腕的决策力。从本团队近期参与处理的几项复杂的债务逾期及潜在违约案例来看,危机的表象多种多样,除了资金周转困难带来直接的偿付危机;有的则是债务人控制人挪用公司资金投入股市炒股,有的是公司实际控制人陷入刑事调查和指控,也有的则更为隐蔽,债务人关联主体在境外受到他国政府的调查等等。这些危机虽然不一定直接表现为到期不付,但可能已经导致债务人违反融资文件的陈述、承诺条款,甚至通过交叉违约触发了违约事件或潜在违约事件。

本文旨在梳理危机处理的思路,通盘策划全面追索资产的策略,为贷款管理工作层面制定一份简介易行的“工作方案”,以便为后续的债务重组和清偿争取宝贵的时间,避免弯路:

一、梳理融资文件

As the Chinese economy enters the “new normal”, the Chinese government has been adjusting its industrial and credit-related policies and strengthening regulation of Chinese financial institutions. A large number of non-performing loans (NPLs) as well as actual loan defaults have started to surface. The risks associated with rising levels of NPLs require Chinese banks to enhance their ex ante and ex post credit risk management practices.