Fulltext Search

In the recent case of In the matter of Gondon Five Pty Limited and Cui Family Asset Management Pty Limited [2019] NSWSC 469, the New South Wales Supreme Court (Brereton J) considered the purpose and scope of an appointment as receiver to a company, and came down particularly hard on an insolvency practitioner for performing work and incurring expenses which were determined to be outside, or not incidental to, the scope of his appointment.

Background

In a recent case, Emmett AJA of the Supreme Court of New South Wales refused to make an order to terminate the winding up of an incorporated association. In this article, we re-examine the principles with which the Court will have regard when determining whether to exercise its discretion to terminate the winding up of a company or incorporated association.

Background

Receiverships usually arise from a secured creditor exercising their rights under a loan contract or mortgage following a default. But even where no default occurs, the Supreme Court of New South Wales has jurisdiction to appoint a receiver to preserve the property of an association pending the resolution of a dispute about the management of the association’s property.

Jurisdiction

A company’s non-compliance with a statutory demand is the most common method of proving its insolvency in any winding up proceedings. Generally, if it does not make good the debt under the statutory demand within 21 days of service, the company will be presumed to be insolvent. What can a company do if it disputes the legitimacy of the debt?

The basics – compulsory winding up and statutory demands

Prior to March 2017, any right to sue that comprised an asset of a bankrupt’s estate could only be litigated by the trustee of the bankrupt. The inability of a trustee to assign a bankrupt’s cause of action resulted in many such actions not being litigated due to factors such as a lack of resources. This position changed through the insertion into the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) in Schedule 2 of the Insolvency Practice Schedule (Bankruptcy), which expressly permits a trustee to assign to a third party any right to sue that is held by of a bankrupt estate (see section 100-5).

The Limitations Act 1969 (NSW) (Limitations Act) establishes time limits within which plaintiffs must commence civil proceedings, including for the recovery of a debt. A failure to bring a claim within the relevant time period results in the claim lapsing, and the creditor losing its rights to enforce its debt. Accordingly, it is critical that creditors understand how the law restricts their ability to collect debts and any exceptions that they may rely upon as the limitation date approaches.

The statutory demand is a formidable card up a creditor’s sleeve that can result in a company being deemed to be insolvent if it does not pay the creditor’s debt within 21 days of service of the demand. Whether a statutory demand served on an incorporated body other than an Australian company will be effective largely depends on the State or Territory in which the incorporated body is based and whether it is served pursuant to the correct section of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (Corporations Act).

What is a statutory demand?

The special purpose liquidators of Queensland Nickel Pty Ltd (in liq) have been successful in their application in the Supreme Court of Queensland for freezing orders against Mr Clive Palmer and several companies which he controls.[1]

Background

On 28 March 2017, the Turnbull Government released draft legislation which would implement wide-ranging reforms to Australia’s corporate restructuring laws. The draft legislation focuses on reforms to the insolvent trading prohibition (Safe Harbour) and introducing a new stay on enforcing “ipso facto” clauses during certain restructuring procedures (Ipso Facto).

The High Court of Australia in CGU Insurance Ltd v Blakeley & Ors [2016] HCA 2 unanimously confirmed that a third party can join a defendant’s insurer to a proceeding and seek a declaration of rights under the insurance agreement, provided that third party has a ‘real interest’ in the performance of the agreement and that there is practical utility in the court providing that declaration.