过去数年，打包重组（Repackaging）结构盛行，中资金融机构寻求使用其作为便利进入市场的工具，并为客户提供创新的融资方案。

中国房地产行业是最广泛使用该结构的行业之一，该行业在2021年高开低走、大起大跌，并于最后一季急挫。市场预期房地产行业在2022年仍将困难重重。

在此背景下，我们察觉到安排人（Arranger）、中国房地产企业及投资者正在寻求对现有的打包重组交易进行结构调整（restructure）的机会（包括提前终止、展期、增加额外增信措施、置换等安排）。此外，我们还观察到，市场对与中国非房地产行业主体（如融资租赁公司、金融科技公司）相关的资产支持交易的兴趣有所增加。

我们将于本文探讨部分有关修订或提前终止打包重组交易的主要问题，并且概述我们在市场中观察到的典型案例和未来趋势。

温故知新：打包重组交易的基本结构

许多较为简单的打包重组交易的结构一般具有下列特点：

本文主要讨论公司型基金、合伙型基金自行清算的主要流程，并就基金自行清算出现僵局等情形时，如何申请法院启动基金强制清算程序的主要问题作初步探讨。

基金清算适用的法律

对于公司型基金的清算，其主要适用《公司法》以及《最高人民法院关于适用＜中华人民共和国公司法＞若干问题的规定（二）》（下称“《公司法司法解释二》”）《关于审理公司强制清算案件工作座谈会纪要》（下称“《强制清算纪要》”）以及部分高院出台的相关审判指导。

对于合伙型基金的清算，除适用《合伙企业法》外，可参照公司法律的有关规定。对此，《民法总则》第一百零八条规定，“非法人组织除适用本章规定外，参照适用本编第三章第一节的有关规定”；第三编第一节对法人清算作出了相关规定，其中第七十一条规定，“法人的清算程序和清算组职权，依照有关法律的规定；没有规定的，参照适用公司法律的有关规定”。例如，北京一中院在（2020）京01清申27号《民事裁定书》中基于上述规定，认定合伙型基金的清算应当参照《公司法》的相关规定进行。

除前述规定外，中国证监会、中基协的相关规定，以及其他行业自治组织的相关规定，亦可作为基金清算的依据。

In Shameeka Ien v. TransCare Corp., et al. (In re TransCareCorp.), Case No. 16-10407, Adv. P. No. 16-01033 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2020) [D.I. 157], the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York recently refused to dismiss WARN Act claims against Patriarch Partners, LLC, private equity firm (“PE Firm“), and its owner, Lynn Tilton (“PE Owner“), resulting from the staggered chapter 7 bankruptcies of several portfolio companies, TransCare Corporation and its affiliates (collectively, the “Debtors“).

Joining three other bankruptcy courts, Judge Thuma of the District of New Mexico recently held that the rules issued by the Small Business Administration (“SBA“) that restrict bankrupt entities from participating in the Paycheck Protection Program (“PPP“) violated the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, H.R. 748, P.L. 115-136 (the “CARES Act”), as well as section 525(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.

The Southern District of New York recently reminded us in In re Firestar Diamond, Inc., et al., Case No. 18-10509 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. April 22, 2019) (SHL) [Dkt. No. 1482] that equitable principles in bankruptcy often do not match those outside of bankruptcy. Indeed, bankruptcy decisions often place emphasis on equality of treatment amongst all creditors and are less concerned with inequities to individual creditors.

Introduction

In Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., f/b/o Jerome Guyant, IRA v. Highland Construction Management Services, L.P. et al., Nos. 18-2450-52 (4th Cir. March 17, 2020), the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals recently upheld that a borrower’s indirect economic interests in a limited liability company (LLC) were not assigned to a lender under a conveyance in a security agreement assigning mere membership interests, pursuant to Virginia state law.

Facts

Setoff is a right that allows a creditor to offset a prepetition debt owed to a debtor with its prepetition claim against the debtor.  See In re Luongo, 259 F.3d 323, 334 (5th Cir.

Setoff is a right that allows a creditor to offset a prepetition debt owed to a debtor with its prepetition claim against the debtor. See In re Luongo, 259 F.3d 323, 334 (5th Cir. 2001). This remedy is aimed at preventing the inequitable and inefficient result that occurs when a creditor is forced to pay a 100% of its prepetition debt owed to a debtor, without resolving its prepetition claim. In such circumstances, the creditor is often forced to later prosecute its unresolved claim against the debtor and is commonly only awarded a fraction of the value of its claim.

Bankruptcy and class actions each establish elaborate procedures and provide a convenient forum to resolve numerous claims against one or more defendants, in an efficient manner. However, while a class action focuses on providing adequate representation to claimants with similar claims, bankruptcy focuses on enabling an insolvent company to reorganize. The two goals do not necessarily blend well in every circumstance.