In a decision rendered on June 6, 2022, Justice Sotomayor authored the Supreme Court’s unanimous decision in the case Siegel v. Fitzgerald, holding that a statutory increase in United States Trustee’s fees violated the “uniformity” requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause set forth in Article I, § 7, cl. 4 of the United States Constitution, which empowers Congress to establish “uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.”1
过去数年,打包重组(Repackaging)结构盛行,中资金融机构寻求使用其作为便利进入市场的工具,并为客户提供创新的融资方案。
中国房地产行业是最广泛使用该结构的行业之一,该行业在2021年高开低走、大起大跌,并于最后一季急挫。市场预期房地产行业在2022年仍将困难重重。
在此背景下,我们察觉到安排人(Arranger)、中国房地产企业及投资者正在寻求对现有的打包重组交易进行结构调整(restructure)的机会(包括提前终止、展期、增加额外增信措施、置换等安排)。此外,我们还观察到,市场对与中国非房地产行业主体(如融资租赁公司、金融科技公司)相关的资产支持交易的兴趣有所增加。
我们将于本文探讨部分有关修订或提前终止打包重组交易的主要问题,并且概述我们在市场中观察到的典型案例和未来趋势。
温故知新:打包重组交易的基本结构
许多较为简单的打包重组交易的结构一般具有下列特点:
On October 12, 2021, the U.S. Supreme Court denied, without comment, a petition for a writ of certiorari in a case challenging the doctrine of equitable mootness. Equitable mootness has been described as a “narrow doctrine by which an appellate court deems it prudent for practical reasons to forbear deciding an appeal when to grant the relief requested will undermine the finality and reliability of consummated plans of reorganization.”1 By his petition, David Hargreaves—an unsecured noteholder of debtor Nuverra Environmental Solutions Inc.
On December 12, 2019, the Third Circuit issued a decision in In re Odyssey Contracting Corp., finding a debtor-subcontractor had waived its right to appeal from a bankruptcy court’s order directing the prime contractor and the debtor-subcontractor to resolve an adversary proceeding in accordance with a stipulation entered into by the parties and approved by the bankruptcy court prior to trial. This ruling has implications for all parties litigating in the Third Circuit, as the Odyssey ruling makes clear that parties who enter into stipulated agreements that depend on
The District Court for the Southern District of New York has ruled that a trustee could not amend a complaint to add federal constructive fraudulent transfer claims because those claims were preempted by the safe harbor provision of the Bankruptcy Code.[1] The District Court found, under a plain language reading of the safe harbor provision, 11 U.S.C.
In May, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit issued a much anticipated decision in Garvin v. Cook Investments NW, SPNWY, LLC, 922 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir.
Last month, a federal district court affirmed a bankruptcy court’s ruling that an ex-NFL player’s potential future recovery from a concussion-related class action settlement agreement was shielded from the reach of creditors in the former player’s Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding. The ruling turned on the bankruptcy court’s finding that the potential future settlement payments were more akin to a disability benefit, which is exempt under Florida law, than a standard tort settlement, which is not.
Background
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently examined and then clarified and set forth the test for evaluating the appealability of bankruptcy orders in an opinion released in the case Ritzen Group v. Jackson Masonry. In doing so, the appellate court reaffirmed the “longstanding and textually-compelled rule of [a] looser finality” standard in bankruptcy as compared to general civil litigation, and concluded that a denial of a motion to lift stay was a final appealable order subject to the fourteen-day appeals period established in Bankruptcy Rule 8002(a).
Recently, in the Advance Watch bankruptcy, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York ruled that a bankruptcy judge is authorized to enter a final default judgment in an adversary proceeding against a foreign defendant who failed to respond to a validly-served summons and complaint, in spite of being an Article I judge.[1] Notably, the court found that the recent Supreme Court decision, Wellness International Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932 (2015), a further iteration of the Stern v.