On June 29, 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the decision of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York, which held that claims asserted by counterparties in relation to bilateral repurchase agreements do not qualify for treatment as customer claims under the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (“SIPA”).
In a May 4, 2015 opinion1 , the United States Supreme Court held that a bankruptcy court order denying confirmation of a chapter 13 repayment plan is not a final order subject to immediate appeal. The Supreme Court found that, in contrast to an order confirming a plan or dismissing a case, an order denying confirmation of a plan neither alters the status quo nor fixes the rights and obligations of the parties. Although the decision arose in the context of a chapter 13 plan, it should apply with equal force to chapter 11 cases.
On May 21, 2015, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed a decision of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware, which had approved the structured dismissal of the Chapter 11 cases of Jevic Holding Corp., et al. The Court of Appeals first held that structured dismissals are not prohibited by the Bankruptcy Code, and then upheld the structured dismissal in the Jevic case, despite the fact that the settlement embodied in the structured dismissal order deviated from the Bankruptcy Code’s priority scheme.
In a memorandum decision dated May 4, 2015, Judge Vincent L. Briccetti of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York affirmed the September 2014 decision of Judge Robert D. Drain of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York, confirming the joint plans of reorganization (the “Plan”) in the Chapter 11 cases of MPM Silicones LLC and its affiliates (“Momentive”). Appeals were taken on three separate parts of Judge Drain’s confirmation decision, each of which ultimately was affirmed by the district court:
The Bankruptcy Code generally permits intellectual property licensees to continue using licensed property despite a licensor’s bankruptcy filing. However, because the “intellectual property” definition in the Bankruptcy Code does not include “trademarks,” courts have varied on whether trademark licensees receive similar protection. A New Jersey bankruptcy court recently grappled with this issue, concluding that trademark licensees may retain their trademark rights.
In a recent bench decision in In re MPM Silicones, LLC et al., Case No. 14-22503-RDD (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. August 26, 2014), the Bankruptcy Court considered bondholders’ right to recover make-whole premiums (premiums paid for early repayment of debt) upon the payment of accelerated debt following the borrower’s bankruptcy default. The Court ruled that the governing loan documents lacked specific language requiring a make-whole premium upon acceleration.
Dealing a major blow to the trustee’s efforts to recover fraudulent transfers on behalf of the bankruptcy estate of the company run by Bernard Madoff, Judge Jed S. Rakoff of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York held in SIPC v. Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC1 that the Bankruptcy Code cannot be used to recover fraudulent transfers of funds that occur entirely outside the United States.
The Supreme Court has spoken once again on the limited jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts, adding to the understanding derived from Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982), Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989), Langenkamp v. Culp, 498 U.S. 42 (1990) and Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011). Executive Benefits Insurance Agency v. Arkinson, Chapter 7 Trustee of the Estate of Bellingham Insurance Agency, Inc., 573 U.S.
The First Circuit Court of Appeals in In re SW Boston Hotel Venture, LLC, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 6768 (1st Cir. Apr. 11, 2014) recently ruled on a number of issues critical to valuing a secured claim in bankruptcy. Specifically, the court 1) endorsed the use of a “flexible approach” to value collateral under the circumstances of this case, 2) recognized that the date collateral should be valued is the lender’s burden to prove, and 3) confirmed that the pre-petition agreement’s default interest rate should generally be used to determine the post-petition interest rate.
Debtors must provide known creditors with actual notice of a claims bar date if they want the bar date to apply to those creditors. Such was the holding in In re Majorca Isles Master Association, Inc., Case No. 12-19056-AJC, Dkt. No. 222 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. March 27, 2014), where the bankruptcy court stated that when both a debtor and a creditor are “guilty in the handling of a claim and the [d]ebtor is aware of the creditor’s claim, then a tie goes to the creditor[,]” and the creditor’s claim will be allowed.