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Deal structure matters, particularly in bankruptcy. The Third Circuit recently ruled that a creditor’s right to future royalty payments in a non-executory contract could be discharged in the counterparty-debtor’s bankruptcy. The decision highlights the importance of properly structuring M&A, earn-out, and royalty-based transactions to ensure creditors receive the benefit of their bargain — even (or especially) if their counterparty later encounters financial distress.

Background

As discussed in our prior blog entitled “New York’s Sovereign Debt Restructuring Proposals,”[1] three bills were introduced in the New York state legislature to overhaul the way sovereign debt restructurings are handled in New York. Those bills sought to implement a comprehensive mechanism for restructuring sovereign debt, limit recovery on certain sovereign debt claims, and amend the champerty defense.

The first half of 2023 witnessed the failure of three financial institutions in quick succession—Silicon Valley Bank (March 10, 2023), Signature Bank (March 12, 2023), and First Republic Bank (May 1, 2023). This was the first time three financial institutions failed in such a compressed time period since the Great Recession of 2008.

The saga of the first Ultra Petroleum Corp. chapter 11 cases appears to have finally come to an end. Numerous articles have been written on the tortured history of whether certain creditors of Ultra Petroleum are entitled to payment of their contractually mandated Make-Whole Amount and default rate of interest.

Until recently, courts in the Ninth Circuit have generally followed the minority view that non-debtor releases in a bankruptcy plan are prohibited by Bankruptcy Code Section 524(e), which provides that the “discharge of a debt of the debtor does not affect the liability of any other entity on, or the property of any other entity for, such debt.” In the summer of 2020, the Ninth Circuit hinted that its prohibition against non-debtor releases was not absolute, when the court issued its decision in Blixseth v. Credit Suisse, 961 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir.

If a creditor is holding property of a party that files bankruptcy, is it “exercising control over” such property (and violating the automatic stay) by refusing the debtor’s turnover demands? According to the Supreme Court, the answer is no – instead, the stay under Section 362(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code only applies to affirmative acts that disturb the status quo as of the filing date. In other words, the mere retention of property of a debtor after the filing of a bankruptcy case does not violate the automatic stay.

Leveraged loans continue to be a topic of interest in the current environment, particularly when they are pooled and securitized as collateralized loan obligations. A recent decision sheds light on whether and when leveraged loans and similar instruments may be classified as securities and, therefore, be subject to securities laws.

In the past several years, the United States has seen a tidal wave of retail sector chapter 11 cases. The end result for most of those cases has been going out of business and liquidation sales. On March 11, 2020, Modell’s Sporting Goods commenced its chapter 11 cases seeking to follow a similar path taken by other retailers by closing all 153 sporting goods stores in a controlled liquidation. Unfortunately for Modell’s, the COVID-19 crisis hit the United States just as Modell’s commenced its liquidation.

Transfers and transactions up to ten years old may be scrutinized, unwound and recovered by a trustee, the bankruptcy court sitting in Massachusetts recently held in the NECCO (think chalky wafer candy) bankruptcy case. The ruling, in a case of first impression in Massachusetts, expands the reach back period from the typical four-year period for fraudulent transfer recovery, so long as the IRS is a creditor in the case.

In Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. PG&E, 549 U.S. 443 (2007), the Supreme Court held that bankruptcy law does not disallow a post-petition unsecured claim for attorney’s fees to the extent such claim is authorized by a pre-petition contract and not otherwise expressly disallowed. That pronouncement should have stopped all future litigation over the issue. That has not been the case.