The Supreme Court is considering whether to grant review of two bankruptcy cases. On October 3, 2016, the Supreme Court invited the Solicitor General to file briefs expressing the views of the United States. Because the Supreme Court’s justices normally give significant weight to the federal government’s recommendations regarding interpretations of federal statutes (here, the Bankruptcy Code), the Solicitor General’s forthcoming briefs could influence whether the Supreme Court grants cert. on the two notable bankruptcy cases.

Southwest Securities v. Segner

In an earlier blog piece we reported on the Third Circuit’s 2015 decision in In re Jevic Holding Corp. where the Court approved a settlement, implemented through a structured dismissal, which allowed junior creditors to receive a distribution prior to senior creditors being paid in full.

Either from our prior posts here and here, or from the great posts from Stone and Baxter’s Plan Propon

While secured creditors are entitled to special rights in bankruptcy, those rights may differ depending on whether creditors have a statutory or consensual lien on their collateral. This is primarily because section 552(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides, in part, that “property acquired by the estate or by the debtor after the commencement of the case is not subject to any lien resulting from any security agreement . . .

You may recall the holding and analysis of ASARCO [1]/ from Jay’s previous post, here.

It is a familiar scenario: a company is on the verge of bankruptcy, bound by the terms of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA), and unable to negotiate a new agreement.  However, this time, an analysis of this distressed scenario prompted a new question: does it matter if the CBA is already expired, i.e., does the Bankruptcy Code distinguish between a CBA that expires pre-petition versus one that has not lapsed?

It is said that muddy water is best cleared by leaving it be.  The Supreme Court’s December 4 decision to review the legality of Puerto Rico’s local bankruptcy law, the Recovery Act, despite a well-reasoned First Circuit Court of Appeals opinion affirming the U.S. District Court in San Juan’s decision voiding the Recovery Act on the grounds that it conflicts with Section 903 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, suggests, at a minimum, that at least four of the Justices deemed the questions raised too interesting to let the First Circuit have the last word.

The Supreme Court of the United States recently addressed whether estate professionals could recover fees expended in defending fee applications. Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC, 576 U.S. _____ (2015). A divided court ruled that the plain language of 11 U.S.C. § 330(a)(1) allowed compensation only for “actual, necessary services rendered[,]” and that to allow fees for defending fee applications would be contrary to the statute and the “American Rule” that each litigant pay her own attorneys’ fees unless a statute or contract provides otherwise.

The Bankruptcy Code generally permits intellectual property licensees to continue using licensed property despite a licensor’s bankruptcy filing. However, because the “intellectual property” definition in the Bankruptcy Code does not include “trademarks,” courts have varied on whether trademark licensees receive similar protection. A New Jersey bankruptcy court recently grappled with this issue, concluding that trademark licensees may retain their trademark rights.

In a recent bench decision in In re MPM Silicones, LLC et al., Case No. 14-22503-RDD (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. August 26, 2014), the Bankruptcy Court considered bondholders’ right to recover make-whole premiums (premiums paid for early repayment of debt) upon the payment of accelerated debt following the borrower’s bankruptcy default. The Court ruled that the governing loan documents lacked specific language requiring a make-whole premium upon acceleration.