It was first published by the Governance Institute of Australia.

In the event of a contractual counterparty going into liquidation, whether or not a trade counterparty may claim set-off against debts owed to the insolvent counterparty can dramatically affect the commercial position of the account debtor. This was recently highlighted in the decision of Hamersley Iron Pty Ltd v Forge Group Power Pty Ltd (In Liquidation) (Receivers and Managers appointed) [2017] WASC (2 June 2017).

What does this mean for you?

On 28 March 2017, the Turnbull Government released draft legislation which would implement wide-ranging reforms to Australia’s corporate restructuring laws. The draft legislation focuses on reforms to the insolvent trading prohibition (Safe Harbour) and introducing a new stay on enforcing “ipso facto” clauses during certain restructuring procedures (Ipso Facto).

In an earlier blog piece we reported on the Third Circuit’s 2015 decision in In re Jevic Holding Corp. where the Court approved a settlement, implemented through a structured dismissal, which allowed junior creditors to receive a distribution prior to senior creditors being paid in full.

While secured creditors are entitled to special rights in bankruptcy, those rights may differ depending on whether creditors have a statutory or consensual lien on their collateral. This is primarily because section 552(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides, in part, that “property acquired by the estate or by the debtor after the commencement of the case is not subject to any lien resulting from any security agreement . . .

The High Court of Australia in CGU Insurance Ltd v Blakeley & Ors [2016] HCA 2 unanimously confirmed that a third party can join a defendant’s insurer to a proceeding and seek a declaration of rights under the insurance agreement, provided that third party has a ‘real interest’ in the performance of the agreement and that there is practical utility in the court providing that declaration.

It is a familiar scenario: a company is on the verge of bankruptcy, bound by the terms of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA), and unable to negotiate a new agreement.  However, this time, an analysis of this distressed scenario prompted a new question: does it matter if the CBA is already expired, i.e., does the Bankruptcy Code distinguish between a CBA that expires pre-petition versus one that has not lapsed?

It is said that muddy water is best cleared by leaving it be.  The Supreme Court’s December 4 decision to review the legality of Puerto Rico’s local bankruptcy law, the Recovery Act, despite a well-reasoned First Circuit Court of Appeals opinion affirming the U.S. District Court in San Juan’s decision voiding the Recovery Act on the grounds that it conflicts with Section 903 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, suggests, at a minimum, that at least four of the Justices deemed the questions raised too interesting to let the First Circuit have the last word.

The unanimous decision by the Full Court of the Federal Court in Templeton v Australian and Securities Investments Commission [2015] FCAFC 137 confirms that the concept of proportionality is a well-recognised factor in considering the question of reasonable remuneration for an insolvency practitioner, and that, in assessing a remuneration claim, the Court can take into account the quality and complexity of the work as well as the value and nature of any property dealt with and the time reasonably spent.

The Bankruptcy Code generally permits intellectual property licensees to continue using licensed property despite a licensor’s bankruptcy filing. However, because the “intellectual property” definition in the Bankruptcy Code does not include “trademarks,” courts have varied on whether trademark licensees receive similar protection. A New Jersey bankruptcy court recently grappled with this issue, concluding that trademark licensees may retain their trademark rights.