The Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (the Act) provides a regime by which a debtor can compromise with his/her creditors outside formal bankruptcy. The provisions are found in Part X (Personal Insolvency Agreements) and Part IX (Debt Agreements) of the Act.

DEBT AGREEMENTS

The High Court has recently clarified what is required for the creation of an express trust (Korda & Ors v Australian Executor Trustees (SA) Ltd [2015] HCA 6 (Korda)).

To be effective, express trusts must satisfy the three certainties of intention, subject matter and object. That is:

CLARITY OF INTENTION KEY TO CREATION OF EXPRESS TRUSTS: A WIN FOR RECEIVERS 

The High Court has recently clarified what is required for the creation of an express trust (Korda & Ors v Australian Executor Trustees (SA) Ltd [2015] HCA 6 (Korda)).

To be effective, express trusts must satisfy the three certainties of intention, subject matter and object. That is:

SUMMARY

The Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia have confirmed that a judgment on assessed costs is a final orders for the purposes of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (Act), and therefore that a costs order can ground a bankruptcy notice for the purposes of the Act.

THE PERILS OF AMBIGUITY IN BANKRUPTCY NOTICES

The Bankruptcy Act ('the Act') is prescriptive as to the form and content of bankruptcy notices. Courts have often observed that close observance of the rules is necessary in light of the serious consequences faced by debtors upon bankruptcy and failure to do so may result in the notices being rendered invalid.

ABILITY TO SEEK AN EXTENSION OF TIME

Section 588FF(3) of the Corporations Act 2001 (the Act) provides liquidators with a mechanism by which to obtain an extension of time within which proceedings against the recipients of voidable transactions may be commenced.

The Bankruptcy Code generally permits intellectual property licensees to continue using licensed property despite a licensor’s bankruptcy filing. However, because the “intellectual property” definition in the Bankruptcy Code does not include “trademarks,” courts have varied on whether trademark licensees receive similar protection. A New Jersey bankruptcy court recently grappled with this issue, concluding that trademark licensees may retain their trademark rights.

In a recent bench decision in In re MPM Silicones, LLC et al., Case No. 14-22503-RDD (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. August 26, 2014), the Bankruptcy Court considered bondholders’ right to recover make-whole premiums (premiums paid for early repayment of debt) upon the payment of accelerated debt following the borrower’s bankruptcy default. The Court ruled that the governing loan documents lacked specific language requiring a make-whole premium upon acceleration.

The Supreme Court has spoken once again on the limited jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts, adding to the understanding derived from Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982), Granfinanciera v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989), Langenkamp v. Culp, 498 U.S. 42 (1990) and Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011). Executive Benefits Insurance Agency v. Arkinson, Chapter 7 Trustee of the Estate of Bellingham Insurance Agency, Inc., 573 U.S.

The First Circuit Court of Appeals in In re SW Boston Hotel Venture, LLC, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 6768 (1st Cir. Apr. 11, 2014) recently ruled on a number of issues critical to valuing a secured claim in bankruptcy. Specifically, the court 1) endorsed the use of a “flexible approach” to value collateral under the circumstances of this case, 2) recognized that the date collateral should be valued is the lender’s burden to prove, and 3) confirmed that the pre-petition agreement’s default interest rate should generally be used to determine the post-petition interest rate.