Two recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions demonstrate that the corporate attribution doctrine is not a one-size-fits-all approach.
Court approval of a sale process in receivership or Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (“BIA”) proposal proceedings is generally a procedural order and objectors do not have an appeal as of right; they must seek leave and meet a high test in order obtain it. However, in Peakhill Capital Inc. v.
The High Court in Singapore has ordered the winding up of Hodlnaut Pte Ltd, a Singapore based cryptocurrency lending and borrowing platform, as it was cash flow insolvent given that the cryptocurrency funds held by the company from various creditors count as ‘debts’ within the meaning of s125(1)(e) of the Insolvency, Restructuring and Dissolution Act 2018 (IRDA).
As a director of a company, the regulatory landscape in England and Wales can feel like a scary place. The possible ways a director can become exposed can feel endless – especially if one asks Google.
Just ask any corporate lawyer fortunate enough to own the tome that is the Companies Act 2006. In the absence of becoming a legal expert, what can directors practically do to best protect themselves when carrying out their role?
This article will discuss whether or not a winding-up petition or bankruptcy petition can be based upon a liquidated amount of crypto which is due and payable by one party to another (a crypto-debt).
An example of such a case could be where party A agrees to transfer 100 widgets to party B in exchange for five bitcoin. Assume party A delivers the widgets, and party B accepts receipt and raises no issue with the widgets, and does not dispute their liability to transfer five bitcoin to party B.
The economic fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic will leave in its wake a significant increase in commercial chapter 11 filings. Many of these cases will feature extensive litigation involving breach of contract claims, business interruption insurance disputes, and common law causes of action based on novel interpretations of long-standing legal doctrines such as force majeure.
U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Dennis Montali recently ruled in the Chapter 11 case of Pacific Gas & Electric (“PG&E”) that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) has no jurisdiction to interfere with the ability of a bankrupt power utility company to reject power purchase agreements (“PPAs”).
The Supreme Court this week resolved a long-standing open issue regarding the treatment of trademark license rights in bankruptcy proceedings. The Court ruled in favor of Mission Products, a licensee under a trademark license agreement that had been rejected in the chapter 11 case of Tempnology, the debtor-licensor, determining that the rejection constituted a breach of the agreement but did not rescind it.
Few issues in bankruptcy create as much contention as disputes regarding the right of setoff. This was recently highlighted by a decision in the chapter 11 case of Orexigen Therapeutics in the District of Delaware.
The judicial power of the United States is vested in courts created under Article III of the Constitution. However, Congress created the current bankruptcy court system over 40 years ago pursuant to Article I of the Constitution rather than under Article III.