Two recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions demonstrate that the corporate attribution doctrine is not a one-size-fits-all approach.
Court approval of a sale process in receivership or Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (“BIA”) proposal proceedings is generally a procedural order and objectors do not have an appeal as of right; they must seek leave and meet a high test in order obtain it. However, in Peakhill Capital Inc. v.
The Privy Council has handed down judgment in two appeals (ETJL v Halabi; ITGL v Fort Trustees [2022] UKPC 36) concerning the nature and scope of the right of a trustee to recover from or be indemnified out of trust assets in respect of liabilities and other expenditure properly incurred by the trustee. A seven-member Board was convened because the Privy Council was asked to reconsider part of its decision in Investec Trust (Guernsey) Ltd v Glenalla Properties Ltd [2019] AC 271.
Last Friday, the Court of Appeal handed down judgment in Al Jaber v Mitchell [2021] EWCA Civ 1190, a keenly awaited decision which considers with the application of the doctrine of immunity from suit to statements given by a former director during an examination under section 236 Insolvency Act 1986.
The High Court has had to grapple with the application of witness immunity and the unique examination process under section 236 Insolvency Act 1986. Witness immunity (or immunity from suit) provides that no witness, party, counsel or judge may be liable for words spoken or evidence given in court proceedings; it is an absolute immunity from any civil proceedings based on such conduct.
The High Court has had to grapple with the application of witness immunity and the unique examination process under section 236 Insolvency Act 1986. Witness immunity (or immunity from suit) provides that no witness, party, counsel or judge may be liable for words spoken or evidence given in court proceedings; it is an absolute immunity from any civil proceedings based on such conduct.
The economic fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic will leave in its wake a significant increase in commercial chapter 11 filings. Many of these cases will feature extensive litigation involving breach of contract claims, business interruption insurance disputes, and common law causes of action based on novel interpretations of long-standing legal doctrines such as force majeure.
U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Dennis Montali recently ruled in the Chapter 11 case of Pacific Gas & Electric (“PG&E”) that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) has no jurisdiction to interfere with the ability of a bankrupt power utility company to reject power purchase agreements (“PPAs”).
The Supreme Court this week resolved a long-standing open issue regarding the treatment of trademark license rights in bankruptcy proceedings. The Court ruled in favor of Mission Products, a licensee under a trademark license agreement that had been rejected in the chapter 11 case of Tempnology, the debtor-licensor, determining that the rejection constituted a breach of the agreement but did not rescind it.
Few issues in bankruptcy create as much contention as disputes regarding the right of setoff. This was recently highlighted by a decision in the chapter 11 case of Orexigen Therapeutics in the District of Delaware.