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Two recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions demonstrate that the corporate attribution doctrine is not a one-size-fits-all approach.

Court approval of a sale process in receivership or Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (“BIA”) proposal proceedings is generally a procedural order and objectors do not have an appeal as of right; they must seek leave and meet a high test in order obtain it. However, in Peakhill Capital Inc. v.

In a recent decision, the Court of Appeal upheld a High Court finding, which granted a declaration under section 819 of the Companies Act 2014 (CA 2014), restricting the appellant director (Appellant) from acting as a director or secretary of a company for a period of five years, unless the company meets the requirements set out in subsection (3) of section 819.

Background

In a recent High Court decision, it was ruled that the liquidator not only failed in his application before the court, but in bringing forward an application that was 'doomed to fail', the liquidator was acting negligently and breached his duty of care to the company as liquidator. As a result, the liquidator was held personally liable for the costs of the application.

The Revenue Commissioners have issued some recent welcome clarifications about certain provisions of the Government's temporary wage subsidy scheme.

Application for the Subsidy Scheme – An Admission of Insolvency?

The main provisions of the subsidy scheme are set out in Section 28 of the Emergency Measures in the Public Interest (Covid-19) Act 2020.

That section also contains the criteria for an employer's eligibility to avail of the subsidy scheme. One such criterion is that:

The economic fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic will leave in its wake a significant increase in commercial chapter 11 filings. Many of these cases will feature extensive litigation involving breach of contract claims, business interruption insurance disputes, and common law causes of action based on novel interpretations of long-standing legal doctrines such as force majeure.

U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Dennis Montali recently ruled in the Chapter 11 case of Pacific Gas & Electric (“PG&E”) that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) has no jurisdiction to interfere with the ability of a bankrupt power utility company to reject power purchase agreements (“PPAs”).

The Supreme Court this week resolved a long-standing open issue regarding the treatment of trademark license rights in bankruptcy proceedings. The Court ruled in favor of Mission Products, a licensee under a trademark license agreement that had been rejected in the chapter 11 case of Tempnology, the debtor-licensor, determining that the rejection constituted a breach of the agreement but did not rescind it.

Few issues in bankruptcy create as much contention as disputes regarding the right of setoff. This was recently highlighted by a decision in the chapter 11 case of Orexigen Therapeutics in the District of Delaware.

The judicial power of the United States is vested in courts created under Article III of the Constitution. However, Congress created the current bankruptcy court system over 40 years ago pursuant to Article I of the Constitution rather than under Article III.